Loyola University Chicago

Loyola eCommons
Master's Theses

Theses and Dissertations

1949

The Political Problems in Mississippi During the Reconstruction
Period 1863-1876
John J. Beckman
Loyola University Chicago

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses
Part of the History Commons

Recommended Citation
Beckman, John J., "The Political Problems in Mississippi During the Reconstruction Period 1863-1876"
(1949). Master's Theses. 733.
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/733

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more
information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 1949 John J. Beckman

The Political Problems in Mississippi
during the Reconstruction Period
1863 - 1876

by

John J. Beckman, S.J.

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF MASTER OF ARTS IN LOYOLA
UNIVERSITY
JUNE
1949

Vita Auctoris
John J. Beckman, S.J. was born in
Cincinnati Ohio, February 25, 1921.

He attended

Holy Family Parochial School where he completed
his elementary education in 1935.

Four years

later he was graduated from St. Xavier High School,
CinCinnati, Ohio.

He then attended xavier University,

CinCinnati, Ohio, where in January, 1943, he
received his degree of Bachelor of Arts in History.
In February of the same year he entered the
Novitiate of the Sacred Heart, Milford, Ohio.
In the fall of 1946 he registered in Loyola
University graduate school, at the same time
furthering his study of philosophy at West Baden
College, West Baden Springs, Indiana, an affiliated
College.

TABLE
CHAPTER
I.

OF

CONTENTS
PAGE

THE CONQUERED SOUTH: • • • • • • • ••
1
The social-economic conditions which
faced the Confederate soldiers when
they returned from the lost cause.

:tIe

THE ADVOCATES OF ivJERCY ... 1863.lSe6 . .
20
The plans of Reconstruction favored by
President Lincoln and after him by
President Johnson. The extent of
reconstruction under these lienient
plans.

III.

CONGRESS DO~rrNATES - 1866-1867 • • ••
34
The Republican Congress nullifies the
Presidential Plans and demands justice
rather than mercy. The enactment of
the Civil Hights Bill, the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the Reconstruction Acts.

IV.

MISSISSIPPI BOWS - 1868-1870 • • • ••
48
The reorganization of Mississippi according to the prescriptions laid down by
Congress. 'l'he rise of the Republican
party, the Black and Tan Convention,
defeat of the constitution, its final
passage and the success of the liepublicans.

V.

ALCORN AND POVfJ£RS - l870-l87~ • • • ••
71
The first four years under the new
government. Administration of
Governor Alcorn and Powers; the reorganization of state government in all
its branches; racial disorders and the
campaign of 1873.

VI.

THE CARPETBAG REGIHili - 1874-1875 • • • • 93
The two years under the governorship
of Ames and his associate Davis.
Packing the judiciary, negro domination,
financial chaos, the Vicksburg riot;
the peoples' last appeal and the legislature's retort.

VII.

DEhiOCRATIC HOlvIE RULE - 1876 • • • • • • 116
The reorganization of the Democratic Party, the election of 1875
and tre Democratic victory; racial
disorders; the impeachment of State
Officials and the amendment of the
flagrant abuses.

VIII.

A SKELETON IN OUR CLOSET • • • • • • •• 131
A summary of the important points
in the paper which prove that the
Radical Republican Reconstruction
was the cause of the solid South
of today.

BIBLIOGR.APHY. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 141

CHAPTER I
THE

CONQUE~ED

SOUTH

The South which was returned to the native
whites when President Hayes withdrew the federal
troops, was unable to return to the past that it
had known before the war.

In half a generation,

war and reconstruction had decimated the population, destroyed what was perhaps the chief single
type of property, and wrought tremendous social upheavals.

As the Southerners regained control of their

state governments, they faced two possible alternatives:
they might attempt to recreate the social, economic
and political structure of the Old South, or they
might imitate the North in an effort to bring the South
abreast of the national development.

Nostalgia beck-

oned them to the old way of life; the "Yankee" virus
of ambition and progress pointed the way to a "New
South".
This was in 1876 eleven years after the armies
of the Union and the Confederacy had been disbanded.
Eleven long years, finally the silver lining was
beginning to border the black clouds that had hung
over the defeated South.
I

Eleven years, and finally

2

the South could look to the future with some spark
of hope, hope that had all but died in the strongest
of hearts during the dark years of reconstruction,
years which had embittered for life many a Southerner,
years whch taught him to hate the "damned Yankee."
The Confederate army was disbanded in 1865 and,
as the Confederate soldiers came straggling back to
their communities, their hearts were crushed with
memories of the lost cause, and by the sight of the
deplorable conditions that met them.

They found

many of their former neighbors missing; they found
property destroyed, the labor system disorganized,
and the inhabitants in many places suffering from
want; they also found the white people\ demoralized
and sometimes divided among themselves, the Negroes
freed, bewildered, and disordered for organized
government had lapsed with the surrender of the
Confederate armies. l

1.

J. G. Randall, The Civil War and Reconstruction,
D. G. Heath Company, New York, 1937, 691-694

3

Around this disorganized society lay a devasted
land.

ihe destruction of property affected all classes

of the population.

The accumulated capital of the

South had disappeared in worthless confederate stocks,
bonds and currency.

The banks had failed early in

the war, and two billion dollars invested in slaves
had been wiped out.

Factories which had been running

before the war, or which were developed after 1861
to supply the blockaded country, had been destroyed
by Federal raiders, or seized and sold, or dismantled
because they had furnished supplies to the Confederacy.
The mining industry was paralized.

Public buildings

which had been used for war purposes were destroyed
or confiscated for the use of the army or for the
new freedmen's schools.

It took months before court-

houses, state capitols, school and college buildings
could again be made available for normal useo 2

2.

James Truslow Adams, America's Tragedy, Charles
Scribner's Sons, New York, 1935, 385.

4

As a result, we would hardly expect the
economic outlook to be very encouraging at the beginning of reconstruction.

In Mississippi, as in

the other Sourhern States, the people were generally
impoverished for farms had gone to waste; fences had
been torn down or rotted away; fields were overgrown
with weeds and bushes; farm implements were rusted
and tools broken beyond use; live stock had disappeared,
hardly enough animals remained to meet the demands
of agriculture. 3 All this spelled the ruin and
abandonment of the plantations, once the pride of
the South.

Even small farms were delapidated; farmers

and planters everywhere found themselves "land poor".
There was enough land to satisfy the most greedy,
but without labor, equipment, seed and money, all was
as nothing.

"A man with hundreds of acres might be as

poor as a negro refugee."

3.
4.

4

James Wilford Garner, Reconstruction in Mississippi,
The Macmillan Company, New York, 1901, 122.
Walter Lynwood Fleming, The Sequel of Appomattox,
Yale University Press, New Haven, 1921, 3.

5

In a desperate attempt to raise money for the
necessities of life, so many acres were put on the
market at such a low level that the land depreciated
to an almost unbelievable price.

Poorer farmers

rejoiced if they received as little as twenty-five
cents for

an acre, while the best of the plantations
5
were sacrificed at three dollars per acre.
In
Mississippi, land depreciation in one county alone
.

reached $10,000,000.

6

And the revenue from the sale

of land proved of little help to the needy whites.
Stocks of merchandise in the South had disappeared
because Northern merchants had sustained a heavy loss
with the failure of Southern markets and they were
cautious about extending credit.

Window glass, furni-

ture, dishes, cooking utensils, pins, needles and
thread and other necessities were wanting.?
The greatest loss by far was that of the emancipated slaves.

For the entire South, the financial loss

was estimated at somewhere over two billion dollars.

5.
6.
?
8.

Garner, 135
Ibid., 124-125
1i'leming~ 5
Adams v?9

8

6

Mississippi, the state with the largest number of
slaves, suffered tremendously.

One county alone,

Hinds County, claimed to have lost $11,000,000
9

through the liberation.

Moreover, the negro was

not only lost property, he was lost labor; and the
readjustment of the labor system to new conditions
growing out of emancipation taxed the best minds of
the North and South; a problem that even today remains
unsolved.
Not one planter in ten believed that free negro
labor could be made profitable; if the Negroes were
to work, compulsion was necessary.

Freed from their

bondage, the Negroes reveled in a sort of protracted
holiday, and even they knew that this could not go on.
Their once fine dreams of "forty acres and a mule"
proved to be no more than bubbles bursting in their
faces.

Disease and starvation drove them to seek help

from their former masters, but even then the planters

9.

Garner, 125

7

found themselves hard pressed for suitable labor.
To insure steady labor, landowners were willing to
contract for laborers, however the Negro refused to
contract for a whole year and insisted upon employment by the month, according to the rules of the
10
Freedmen's bureau.
'rhis was, of course, a very
unsatisfactory method for the CUltivation of cotton,
because of the almost moral certainty that the Negro
would make a change of employers at the end of the
month and leave the crop owner with a large investment and scant hope of harvest.

Many liberated slaves

were so shiftless and so incapable of assuming responsibilities that they and their families were wiped
11
out by starvation or disease.

10.
11.

William archibald Dunning, Reconstruction,
Political and Economic, Harper and Brothers,
New York, 1907, 46.
The State census of Mississippi showed in 1866
a decrease of 56,146 in the negro population.
Most of these are believed to have "died from
disease and starvation resulting from their
sudden emancipation. 1I Garner, 124.

-

._-
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8

Reconstruction in the South might have been
managed in spite of the emancipation of the Negro,
if the manpower of the whites had not also suffered.
In Mississippi, as in other states, there was hardly
a home in which there was not mourning for some
member of the family who had been killed in the war.
Those who had made the sacrifice were the young and
vigorous who were now so much needed in the work of
economic reorganization.

It is no exaggeration to

say that in Mississippi one half of the male whites
fell in the lost cause, while one half of those
remaining bore "unmistakenable evidence of severe
12
campaigning."
In desperation, the people of the South turned
their attention to the importation of white immigrants
13
from the North and from Europe.

120
130

Ibid., 123
Ibid., 135-136

9

Associations were formed and agents were sent
abroad to solicit the aid of both German and French
farmers.

'.L'hese efforts, however, met with little

success, and even if importation of labor had proved
successful they could not have reached the South in
time to save the crops.

The soldiers on their return

found it too late to plant even what few crops the
meager resources permitted.
The virtual failure of the attempt to procure a
supply of white laborers by immigration made it necessary to fall back upon the Negro, but how this was
to be accomplished was another question.

'lohe

planters had to safeguard their interests and at the
same time make working profitable for the Negro.
But several economic elements appeared to facilitate
the solution of this problem.

'.L'he white man owned

the land, stock and farming implements; the freedmen
could furnish the labor.

The relative value of each

was a problem to be determined by experiment.

Some

landowners rented their land for a stipulated sum,
but when they realized how difficult it was to collect

10

the rent from poverty stricken tenants, this plan
was soon abandoned.

Others, however, rented their

land for a stipulated share of the produce, but
this did not appeal to the colored folks since they
had neither stock nor implements to work a farm.
'llhe most common method adopted was the "share system."
The freedmen were not able to equip a farm nor secure
credit, whereas the planters could.

And these planters

agreed to furnish the land, seed, farm implements and
animals, and, most of all, give security for any supplies the Negro might need.

The Negro was to plant,

cultivate and gather the crops in return for a certain portion of them, usually one-half, though in
14
some cases only a third.
However successful such a system might have been
in other states, in Mississippi, even this system was
disasterous to both parties in 1866 and 1867, when,
because of floods, drought and insects, the yield was
not sufficient to pay for the food and clothing of the

140

Ibid., 136-138

11

laborers.

The failure, however, was not due solely

to unfavorable seasons, but in a great measure to
the unreliable character of the Negro, whose undertakings nearly always ended in failure.

He was peculi-

arly unfitted for the cultivation of cotton, which
demands careful attention for the greater part of the
year.

"Free to go where he pleased, and to own fire

arms, he hunted and fished, attended 'frolics' and
protracted meetings, while the grass choked his cotton
15
to death."
Together with the "share system" there developed
a system of credit which made matters worse.

Poverty

stricken planters mortgaged their future crops to a
merchant or landlord in exchange for subsistence until
the harvest.

But as so otten happened, even the mort-

gager was not able to finance his tenant and he had
to be supplied by the banker, who having gained control
by this means could then dictate what crops were to be
planted as well as the time of the sale.

15.

Ibid.,

138

As a result,

12
"the planter or farmer was held to staple crops,
high prices for necessities, high interest rates
16
and frequently unfair bookkeeping."
To the
thrifty, industrious and intelligent man, such a
system was well suited, but it had a disastrous
effect upon the average tenant, who had too small
a share of the crop to feel a strong sense of responsibility as well as too many "privileges" and too
little supervision to .make him eager to produce the
17
best results.
In the belief that the Negroes would work better
for a Northerner, every planter who could do so secured a Northern partner and manager.

Such an offer

appealed strongly to many an ex-union soldier, who
during his stay in Mississippi had been attracted
by great profits in cotton growing.

When offers

failed, these men bought land of their own, lured by
18
its cheapness and the high price of cotton.
It

16.
17.
18.

Fleming, 270
Dunning, 213-214
Adams, 388-389

13
was the concensus of opinion among these immigrants, that with a bit of ingenuity they could
introduce scientific methods and thus revolutionize cotton planting.

They also felt that they

knew the solution to the negro labor problem, but
in both cases they were sadly mistaken.

The un-

tiring energy and thrift of the Northern planter,
and the exacting nature of the service which he
demanded, did not appeal to the slow-going freedman accustomed to the patience and forebearance
of the Southerner.

No one was so quick to declaim

the unreliability of the Negro as those who had
19
helped to emancipate him.
The Northern overseers, too, were so far
from revolutionizing the methods of cotton culture,
that it is not too much to say that they had failed
in their efforts to reclaim the lands of the South,
and with the inauguration of the reconstruction

19.

Garner, 137-139

14

policy in 1867, they virtually abandoned the
land and became office holders.

20

Acute distress continued until late in 1867,
but after that year the wolf no longer menaced
the doors of the common folk.

ouch were the hard-

ships, that many a poor white man never again
reached a comfortable standard of living; some
were so demoralized that they lost all hope or
desire to better their state, while others were so
discouraged that they sought relief in the Viest and
North.

But to the credit of the stalwart South,

the mass of people "accepted the discipline of
21
poverty and made the best of it."

20.

21.

Garner holds that these men are improperly referred to as "carpetbaggers" for "they did not
go South to get offices, for there were no
offices for them to fill at that time. The
causes which led them to settle in the South
were purely economic and not political."
(Garner, 136) But if we take Randall's definition of "carpetbagger" --"one who went South
to make money and seize political power--"then
the term is rightfully applied to this class of
men. (Randall, 847)0
.it'leming, 16.

15

Not only the planters and laborers suffered during these critical days, but much of
the burden was shouldered by those who in the
pre-war days knew not the meaning of work.

The

general paralysis of industry, the breaking up
of society, poverty on all sides made life onerous.
Physicians found no dearth of patients, but could
not even depend upon the ordinary fees.

Lawyers

who had supported the Confederacy found it difficult to get back into reorganized courts because
of the test oaths and the law practice was jealously
guarded by "legal" attorneys.

Education likewise
22
suffered as school masters were very few.
Amid such confusion a change in the Negro

character and life was inevitable.

His once cheer-

ful spirits were now dampened as he faced the
serious matter of providing for himself and his
family.

Since the discipline which accompanied

slavery could no longer keep him in check, the
Negro ran into excesses of petty criminality.

22.

Ibid., 16.

16

Theft was frequent, arson was accepted as a
means of revenge on the whites, and murder became
common in the brawls of the freedmen's quarters.
Morals and manners also suffered under the new
dispensation.

In the crowded and diseased stricken

towns and camps, the conditions under which the
roving Negro lived were less conducive to morals
than to health, for here "there were none of the
restraints to which the blacks had been accustomed
and which they now despised as being a part of their
23
servitude."
What good manners they once may have
had were now replaced by impudence and distrust
because agitators, who were at work among them
taught that politeness to the whites was the earmark of servility.
During these critical times, the demands of the
Radicals for social equality fanned the embers that
lay smoldering in the hearts of the freedmen.

In

Mississippi, it is true, intermarriage was legalized,

23.

Ibid., 42.

17

but for the most part the "Jim Crow" theory--sepa24
ration but equality-- was the ruling norm. Charles
Sumner, a persistent agitator for equal rights,openly
attacked the Jim Crow practice, labeling it "an insuIt and a hinderance, and a bar, which not only destroys comfort and prevents equality, but weakens all
25
other rights".

24.
25.

Garner, 285-287.
Fleming, 276

18
As a final tribute to this rabid reconstructionist
the Radical Congress in 1875 passed the Civil Rights
Act which gave the Negroes equal rights in hotels,
places of amusement, on public carriers and on juries.

26

By the fires of reconstruction the whites were
fused into a more homogenous society.

26.

At first they

The text and veto of this Act may be found in
Henry Steele Commager's book: Documents of
American History, F. S. Croft & Co., New York,
1943, Vol. II, 86-88. Strangely enough such
legislation, according to Dunning, (Essays Qg
the Civil War and Reconstruction, 365-368), found
favor with the Democratic leaders, but for a
different reason. '~'hey realized :eull well that
it would have little effect except in the border
and Northern States, where it would turn thousands
into the Democratic fold. They also felt that
such legislation would in time be declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. And so it
happened. This Act, however, should not be confused with the Civil Rights Act of 1866 which
was designed to protect the freedmen from such
discriminating legislation as the Black Codes.
It was vetoed by President Johnson and passed
again over his veto. The Act conferred citizenship upon the negroes, legislation necessitated
by the Dred Scott decision. Doubt as to the
constitutionality of the measure induced Congress
to enact most of its prOVisions into the Fourteenth
Amendment. Commager, 14-18.

19

excused the Negro, for they knew he was not to be
blamed; but as misrule continued there was united
opposition against the

~egro

in politics.

The

whites were sick and tired of being ruled as a conquered province by the incompetent and dishonest;
they felt no gratitude for any so-called leniency
on the part of the North; they felt no repentance
for the war, nor did they desire humiliation, sackcloth and ashes.

They were bitter because of perse-

cution, resentful because of poor education, sullen
because of overwork, and despondent because the
future offered little hope for betterment.

Coming

into their own were new political leaders, shrewd,
narrow, conservative, honest, parsimonious; but the
constant fighting fire with fire scorched all.

"In

the bitter discipline of reconstruction, the pleasant27
est side of Southern life came to an end."
The
material evils of reconstruction were only temporary,
for state debts have been paid or cancelled, and
wasted resources renewed; but the moral and intellectual consequences of the revolution remain as a
lasting blemish on the pages of our history.

27.

Fleming, 281

CHAPTER II
THE ADVOCATES OF

~mRCY

1863 - 1866

The close of the Civil War found the nation,
as well as the several sections of the country,
facing a variety of complicated and pressing social,
economic, and political problems.

Vast armies had

to be demobilized and re-absorbed into the

eco~omic

life of the nation; production of materials for war
had to give way to production of machinery, to building railroads and tilling the soil.

The civil, as

well as the social, and economic status of the Negro
had to be re-adjusted in the light of the outcome of
the war.

The federal government also had to face

the problem of how to determine the basis on which
the lately rebellious states should again become
normal units of the nation.

'I'hese problems had to be

solved at a time when prejudices and hatred, enkindled
by the war, still ruled the hearts of men.

They were

met by party conventions and legislatures with all
the limitations of partisanship that these terms imply.
In the North there were two schools of thought
concerning treatment of the southern states--the con20

21

servative and the radical camps.

Each group

claimed its host of supporters.

'lihe radicals

desired a stern reckoning with all "rebels",
which for them meant imprisonment, and in some
cases even the execution of the leaders, and they
also hoped to effect an immediate extension of the
right to vote to the Negroes.

The conservatives on

the other hand were inclined toward more gentle measures, since they desired postponment of the heated
suffrage question until satisfactory plans could
be drawn up.

President Lincoln was the champion

of this party.
It was Lincoln's firm conviction that, though
there had been a rupture of the federation, the
southern states had not forfeited their membership
in the Union.

Consequently, the problem, as he

saw it was that of re-cementing the bonds of the
union, and he was willing to do this in a fatherly
spirit.

Late in 1863 his plan was outlined in a

proclamation in which he offered pardon to all,
with the exception of the leaders of the Confederacy,
provided that they would take the oath of loyalty
to the Union, and recognize the laws and proclamations

22

in regard to slavery.

It also provided that as

soon as the number of citizens thus reinstated in
each state reached ten per cent of the number of
votes cast in that state at the election of 1860,
these citizens might establish a government which he
would recognize.

1

It was sincerely hoped that the

people of the South would gather around this nucleus
of loyal voters and soon the reorganization would be
complete.

2

Such a lenient plan was openly opposed by the
radicals because, in general, it left too much power
in the hands of the southern states, and, in particular, because the question of negro suffrage was to
be decided by each state.

It was evident, then, that

there would be an open struggle between the conflicting camps.
Upon the rejection of the plan proposed by
Lincoln, Congress set about drawing up a policy of
its own in the Wade - Davis Bill of July, 1864.

1.

Henry Steele Commager, Documents of American
History, F. S. Croft & Co. New York, 1943 Vol.
1,429 - 431.

2.

J. G. Randall, The Civil War and Reconstruction.
D. C. Heath & Co., New York, 1937, 699.

23

This legislation declared the southern states
outside the Union, and outlined the conditions for
their re-admission;

a majority of the people in any

given state would be required to take the oath of
allegiance before they would be permitted to elect a
constitutional convention for the purpose of inaugurating a new state government.

Conditions set down for

the assembling of this convention were such that "no
person who held or exercised any office, civil or military, state or confederate, under the rebel usurpation,
or who voluntarily bore arms against the United States"
had the right to vote or was eligible for election as
3

delegate to such a convention.

The convention, once

convened, was obliged to declare on behalf of the
people of the State that, those who had held civil
offices, and those confederate military officers above
the rank of colonel would be deprived of the right to
vote or to hold public office; that slavery was to be
abolished, and the confederate debt was to be repud4
iated.
The first provision barred the majority of

3.
4.

Commager, 437
438

~bid.,

24

of white men from participation in the reaonstruction of their state, and the latter deprived
the cream of the southern gentry from holding
public office.

fhis policy was so drastic that

Lincoln refused to sign the bill and it was eventually killed by the pocket veto.

~

But the cause

of the conservatives was doomed with the assassination of their leader on April 14, 1865.
Had Lincoln not fallen at the hands of an
assassin his leadership might have welded the
structure of the Union.

His untimely death was a

catastrophe far greater than was realized.

Though

the standards were gallantly taken up by the new
President,

~~.

Johnson, it was soon evident that

without the leadership and support of his party,
the President's good will and practical judgment
would come to nought.
On May 29, 1865, President Johnson, issued
his proclamation of amnesty and pardon.

5.
6.

Randall, 699-?00
Commager, Vol. II, ?-8.

6

In the

25
main, it promulgated the same principles as Lincoln

I

had enunciated in December 1863.

It differed in the

oath it prescribed as a condition of pardonJ In all
essential points, however, Andrew Johnson furthered
the plan of the late president.

To the consternation

of the radicals, he planned to restrict voting power
in the South to the whites, leaving the question of
negro suffrage to the discretion of each state.

8

Such

benevolence won the support of the majority of the
people from the North, and in the South it also met
with whole hearted cooperation as men quickly presented
themselves for pardon and assisted in establishing new
state governments.9

Also of equal importance was the

president's proclamation issued on the same day appoihting a provisional governor of North Carolina in which
he outlined his plan of restoration for all the southern

7.
8.
9.

Ibid., Vol"I. 429-431; Vol. II, 7-8.
James T. Adams, America's Tragedy, Charles Scribner's
Sons, New York, 1935, 388.
Randall, 74.

26

states.
~he

provisional governor was instructed to call

a convention to be chosen by the "Loyal" people of the
state for the express purpose of making the necessary
constitutional changes prior to Federal restoration.
Only those who had subscribed to the oath of amnesty
were granted the right to vote, and from their number
10
the delegates were to be chosen.
Temporary civil
governments for the states were to be administered under
the authority of the provisional governor, while Federal
functions were to be resumed by the proper officials.
"Side by side with the military authority of the United
States was to be put in operation, as fast as the offices
could be manned, the regular processes of civil govern11
ment so far as these fell within the Federal sphere".

10.
11.

William A. Dunning, Reconstruction, Political and
Economic, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1907, 37.
Ibid., 39

27
In the view of later developments it is important
to remember that Johnson's plan for reconstruction
did not rest upon his own personal authority, but "it
was fully discussed in the cabinet, no member of which
expressed a doubt of the power of the executive branch
of the government to reorganize state governments, which
12
had been in rebellion, without the aid of Congress."

This impetus set the wheels of reconstruction in
motion and within a year identicla proclamations were
issued in favor of the remaining six states of the
Confederacy.

Mississippi received Judge Sharkey as

provisional governor according to a proclamation issued
on June 13, 1865.

As time was too precious to waste,

and no one realized this more than the governor, he
exhort'ad his people to conform to the demands of the
President and to prepare for a constitutional convention
to be held on August 14, 1865.
The Mississippi convention was the first in the
Southern States to convene under the president's policy,
so consequently the eyes of the nation were focused upon

12.

Randall, 713 where he cites from the House Report
No.7, 40 Congress, 1 sess., 401.

28
13
its proceedings.

The problems that faced that

convention were momentous.

Governor Sharkey, after

administering the amnesty oath, laid before the
delegates the program vvhich the president "ardently
14
desired" them to accept.
The delegates, however,
had minds of their own, and only after long hours
of debate and bickering did Mississippi adopt the
required bills necessary for restoration.

~he

first

function of the Convention was to signify by formal
acts the acceptance of the results of the war.

This

was followed by heated arguments concerning the abolition of slavery.

Only after the convincing address

of William Yeoger, "a man of conservative views and
15
one of the ablest lawyers in the state, was a majority
vote obtained in favor of the ordinance which declared
that "slavery, having been destroyed in the state of
Mississippi, neither slavery nor involuntary servitude,

13.
14.
15.

Dunbar Rowland, History of Mississippi, S. J. Clarke
Publishing Company, Chicago, 1925, Vol. II, Ill.
James Wilford Garner, Reconstruction in Mississippi,
The MacMillan Company, New York, 1901, 84 - 85.
Ibid., 88
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except in punishment for crime, whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted, shall hereafter
16
exist in the state.
Thus perished slavery in Mississippi,
killed in the house of its friends, and by
those who loved the institution most. This
was the great work of the convention. After
all, it was but an involuntary acknowledgement of a fact already existing. 17
In the few remaining days of the convention, the
delegates, in accord with the president's wishes,
declared null and void the obnoxious ordinances of
secession, and repudiated the state debts contracted
in prosecuting the war against the United States
government.

Finally such modifications in the old

state constitution were made as would bring it into
18
accord with the new situation.

16.
17.
18.

Convention Journal, 164, as quoted by Garner, 90
Garner, 90
Ibid., 82 - 94

30

'l'his was bitter medicine for the southerners but
the thought of restored health helped to make it
palatable.
~he

Convention set October 2 as the date for

the election of congressmen, and state, district,
and county officers, under the restrictions of the
19
presidential amnesty proclamation.
General
Benjamin G. Humphreys won the people's choice for
the governorship, and the legislature which assembled
on October 16, 1865, was the last to be elected by
20
an exclusively white vote.
The oampaign preceeding this election pivoted around the issue of admiting Negroes in the courts as witnesses.

The opponents

of negro testimony succeeded in electing a majority
21
of the legislature.
Consequently the most important
and the most delicate subject which this body had to
meet was that of the relationship between the whites
and the recently freed Negroes.

19.
20.
21.

The constitutional

Rowland, 113
Ibid .• 116
Robert Selph Henry, The Story of Reconstruction,
The Bobbs - Merrill Co. New York, 1938, 97
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Convention had appointed a committee to make a
study of this touchy question and its report was
duly submitted to the new legislature.

'i'hat such
22

legislation was necessary no one will question.
It was unfortunate, however, that laws had to be
passed at a tLme when the wounds of war were still
smarting.
Mississippi met this problem with the passage
23

of the Black Codes which regulated civil rights,
apprenticeships, vagrancy, and penal crimes.

Such

legislation met with violent opposition in the North
and proved to be the weak link in President Johnson's
chain by which he had hoped to secure Mississippi and
the southern states to the Union.
This faux

~

of Mississippi's legislature was

followed by the rejection of the thirteenth amendment.
Governor Humphrey recommended that the first sectionthe abolition of slavery in all territory within the
United States-be adopted, but that Section 2, empower_
ing Congress to "enforce" the article by appropriate

22.

23.

Walter Lynwood Fleming, The Sequel of ApDomattox,
The Yale University Press, New Haven, 1921, 89-96
Comma er Vol. 92-95
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legislation, be rejected.

A joint standing

committee, however, submitted a report stating
that the first and main article of the amendment
had already been adopted by the state and that the
second article of the amendment "opened the door to
further abuses of power by the Federal government

24

and interference with the rights of the state."
This report concluded:

"Connected as the provisions

are, a ratification of the first and a rejection of
the second would be inoperative and of no effect;

25

therefore, the rejection of both is recommended."
The report was adopted.

This was the second step in

the defeat of President Johnson's plan of reconstruc26
tion.
The effect of "Mississippi's mistakes "were not
immediately felt.

In fact the events that followed

gave no indication that errors had been made at all.
By the end of the year the provisional governor of
Mississippi, was relieved of his duties and the

24.
25.
26.

Rowland, 124-125
Garner, 120
Ibid. 121
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civil government was in full exercise of its
functions.

On April 2, 1866, President Johnson

formally declared the rebellion
the seceeded states except Texas.

at an end in all
On August 20,

1866 he proclaimed "the complete restoration of peace,
order, tranquillity, and civil authority throughout
27
the United States."

27.

Dunning, 41

GHAPTER III
CONGRESS DOMINATES
1866 - 1867

Although Southern ships of state were launched
on supposedly peaceful waters, on the very day that
President Johnson announced that "peace and tranquility" had been restored, the sky was overcast.

The

storm 'IIvhich was brewing was soon to break loose in
all its fury.

The radical Republican members of

congress were irate.
Opposition to the Presidential Plan was not
unforseen.

There had been opposition while Lincoln

1

lived; later it reached its heighth under the leadership of Thaddeus Stevens, the guiding spirit of the
radical wing of the Union party.

2

This group had

its own mind on. reconstruction.
Their aims included the proscription of the
Confederate leaders, extensive confiscation
of plantations in the South, the enfranchisement of the freedmen, and the postponement
of political reorganization in the States
till the continued ascendency of the Union
party could be insured. 3

1.
2.
3.

Cf. Chapter 2, p. 2-4
James Ford Rhodes, History of the United States,
the MacMillan Company, London, 1909, Vol. V 531 ff.
William Archibald Dunning, Reconstruction, Political
and Economic, Harper and Brothers, New York,1907, 420
34
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These planks were completely destroyed as the
administration's policy was unfolded.

~he

Proclama-

tion of Amnesty had offset their desire to punish
the confederates.

Confiscation was stopped short

by the attorney-general's decision that the property
which had been seized by the Federal authorities
under the confiscation acts mBst be restored to the
4

pardoned owners.

Negro suffrage was doomed by the

franchise provisions of Johnson's proclamation; and
the hasty reorganization of state governments under
southern leadership jeopardized the Union party and
5

threatened their control of the national government.
Above all this, Congress feared that the extensive
power which the executive branch had enjoyed during
the war was now being carried over to the period of
reconstruction.

Congress chose a reconstruction

policy of its own as a road back to power.
Since the reconstruction issue would absorb
the interest of Congress in December, 1865, the
Radicals chose this time to unite in open opposition.

4.
5.

J. G. Randall, The Oivil
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The Republican members of the House held a caucus
at which they decided to refuse admission to the
newly chosen southern representatives, and to
withhold approval of the executive reconstruction
policy until Congress could decide on one of its
6

own.

Such a resulution was the call to battle

between executive and legislature, between the
Lincoln-Johnson policy of clement reconstruction,
and the Stevens' theory that the South should be
punished and humiliated.
Conditions in the South at this time confirmed
the Radicals in their punitive policy and drove many
conservatives into the rival camp.

With the libera-

tion of the slaves, it was only natural that responsibilities would be thrown upon the shoulders of many
a freedman who was not equal to such a burden.

For

to his mind freedom from slave labor meant freedom
from all labor.

Victims of illusions of grandeur,

the new race, although free, was without status,
without leadership, without land, without education.

6.

Randall, 722.
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Vagabondage, then, was the consequence.

The

southern whites, with their fingers on the pulse of
the social, civil, and political dangers gripping
the South, rose to meet the situation with the passing
7

of the Black Codes which placed numerous limitations
on the civil liberties of the Negro.

~uch

class

legislation was looked upon by the northern Radicals
as the circumvention of the results of the war, and
8

a disguised attempt to re-enslave the ignorant Negros.
Determined now to be the champion of the liberated slaves, and realizing the possibilities of the
colored population in strengthening southern representation in the House, the Republican Party decided
to win the support of the Negroes.

They attempted

to accomplish this by continuing and increasing the
9

power of the Freedmen's Bureau.

7.

8.
9.

This bureau,

For a summary of these ante-bellum laws cf.
Randall, 728
Ibid., 724-728
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organized in 1865 as a war-time measure, was to
be divested of its power one year after the close
10
of the war.
It was the hope of the Republicans,
however to continue the organization for two years
in order to gain enough time to win the support of
the Negroes and gain control of the South.

Therefore,

to extend the life and power of this bureau a bill
was introduced and passed in Congress, but only to
be met by the veto of the President; yet six

months

later it became law when Congress re-passed the bill.
This piece of legislation did more than merely
11
provide for the freedman.
Officers of the bureau
were invested with "sweeping jurisdiction" and their
power extended over many functions formerly reserved
to state magistrates.

This act, of its very nature

provided the "obvious evils of patronage and bureaucracy and the opportunities for building up a party
12
But the most striking provision of tfuis
machine"

10.
11.
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Commager, Vol. II, 1.
Randall, 731
Ibid.
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bill lay in the establishment of military jurisdiction "under regulations issued through the
Secretary of War over all cases concerning the
13
immunities and rights of freedmen."
This was
usurpation by military courts of civil and criminal
14
jurisdiction "formerly belonging to the state courts".
President Johnson vetoed the bill, and critized
it severly on the score that it was unnecessary,
unconstitutional and "designed for a state of war
11
which no longer existed.
Other potent reasons
for not approving such legislation were that, it
was far too wasteful at a time when severe retrenchment should be the rule, and that it would "coddle
the Negro to his own detriment", to say nothing of
the fact that the bill was passed by a Congress which
16
Despite
had excluded eleven states from its midst.
the opposition on the part of the President, the bill,
17
as noted above, was passed over his veto.
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'l'his ,unfortunately, was not the only point of
conflict between the executive and the legislative
branches, for at the same time Congress introduced and passed the Civil Rights bill which
declared "Negroes to be citizens of the United
States", and gave them "rights equal to those
accorded other citizens, notwithstanding local or
18
state laws or ordinances".
~he President, after
long deliberation, "regretfully" vetoed this bill,
claiming it to be an "invasion of the rights of the
19
states".
The breach between the two branches of
government was now complete, and Congress passed the
20
bill over the veto of the President
in the conviction that they owed protection to the freedmen
against the black codes, an opinion in which many

18.
19.
20.

Commager, Vol, II, 14-15
Ibid., 15-18
It is interesting to note the significance of
this veto.
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a northerner concurred.

21

After securing the backing of the northern
people as well as that of Congress, Stevens and
Sumner began in earnest to further their stern
reconstruction policy which was insipired by
personal grievance rather than by the public
good.

'l'heir first step was to introduce a measure

which ultimately took shape as the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
ment contains four sections:

The amend-

(1) it made citizens

all persons born or naturalized in the United States

21.

According to Rhodes, the passage of the
Civil Rights Bill over the President's
veto "opened a new chapter in the constitutional practice. Since Washington there
had been many vetoes, but never until now
had Congress passed over the President's
veto a measure of importance; and the
country had been wrought up to the highest
tension. 1f (Rhoaes - 586.)
Randall, 734-735.
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and forbade states to abridge their rights;

22

(2) it provided for the reduction of the representation in Congress of any state that denied
the vote to any male citizen of voting age except
those guilty of crime; (3) it disqualified confederate leaders from holding political office
except with the permission of Congress; and (4) it
23
prohibited the payment of confederate debts.

22.

23.

This section of the Fourteenth amendment has
become the crux of many Federal problems. After
defining citizenship--"All persons born or
naturalized in the United States and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the States wherein they
reside,"--then follows the much controverted
clause-uNo state shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
state deprive any person of life, liberty or
property withour-due process of law nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." The scope and purpose
of this amendment was finally handed down by the
Federal Supreme Court in 1873 when deciding on
the constitutionality of the Illinois State
legislation regarding grain elevators, and the
Louisianna State legislation regarding slaughter
houses. (Randall 735-736.)
Commager, Vol. II, 51.
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The first provision placed the civil rights of the
Negro under the protection of the Constitution and
safeguarded them from hostile state legislation.
The second secured for them the right to vote, and
the third took the "pardoning power" out of the
hands of the President.
This amendment was regarded in the South as
an insult and every state except Tennessee defeated
24
it.
Such lack of cooperation incensed the radically dominated Republican Congress, and they then
drafted and passed measures supporting a more extreme plan of reconstruction.

~hey

secceeded in

their plans because they had gained a two-thirds
majority in the Congressional election of 1866,
which gave them power to over-ride all vetoes, and
25
assured them of public backing.
The program unfolded in the winter of 1866-1867
consisted of two parts which were developed simultaneously.

;,l'he first was devoted to the effective

assertion of Congressional supremacy over the executive

24.
25.

Dunning, 83
Ibid., 85
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branch of the government; the second consisted
in the effective assertion of this supremacy in
the conquered South.l'he first measure limiting
the power of the President came in the form of
the Tenure of Office Act which made it impossible
for the President to remove from office, without
consent of the Senate, any civil officer, inclu26
ding members of his own cabinet.
Another curtailment was the Command of the Army Act, according to
which the President was forbidden to issue military
orders except through the General of the Army; or
to relieve the General of his command except at
the General's own request.27

Violations of these

acts were also declared to be misdemeanors punishable by fine and imprisonment.

'J.'his legislation

was also met by Johnson's veto, but to no avail,
for Congress was now powerful enough to over-ride
the veto.
Congress now turned its attention to the
South and enacted a group of laws known as the
Reconstruction Acts, the most important pieces of

26.
27.

Commager, II, 35-36
Ibid., 37-38
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legislation during the decade after the war.
The first of these acts declared governments
of the existing southern states illegal and
inadequate, and divided the South into five
military distructs.

Over each district a

commanding general was appointed who should preserve order, and uphold civil officers and civil
courts, or replace them with military tribunals
as he wished.

Under his direction each state was

to frame and adopt a new constitution which must
provide for negro suffrage.

Only after Congress

should approve the constitution, and when a legislature, elected under its provisions, should adopt
the Fourteenth Amendment, the state might be re28
admitted to the Union.
This Act, when regarded from the military and
the suffrage aspects, leads one to doubt the purity
of intention of the Republican party.

Its leaders

were determined that the Negro should be enfranchised in order to insure themselves a foothold in
the South, a-foothold from which the Republican

28.

Ibid., For a fuller treatment of the Reconstruction acts, cf Randall, 753-760.
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party could climb to power.

But the military

character of the Act is even more bewildering.
On August 20, 1866, the President declared the
country at peace, and three months later the
Supreme Court, in the famous Milligan Case, declared all military tribunals unconstitutional
except where the war made the operation of civil
29
courts impossible.
Now, however, the Republican
Congress passed a bill creating military tribunals
to supplant the civil courts, a "direct and contempt30
uous disregard of the Supreme Court's decision. n
It would seem, then, that Congress was ready to go
to any length to insure the adoption of its reconstruction policy and to organize the South under
the Republican banner.
This act was further supplemented by three
31
other acts of Congress,
two of which were passed
over the President's veto, while the third became

29.
30.
31.

Cf decision of the Federal Supreme Court ex
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Dunning, 94.
Commager, II, 38-39, 41-42, 49.
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law by the operation of the ten-day rule without
32
the President's signature.
The cards were
stacked.

The Radicals were now empowered to en-

force their type of government upon the South.
Their entire plan may be summed up as a plan "to
put the Negro in power over the white race in all
33
the States in the South and to keep him there."

32.
33.

Randall, 760
Words of Senator Doolittle as quoted in Randall,
760.

CHAPTER IV
MISSISSIPPI BOWS
1868 - 1870

Mississippi, like all the other Southern
States, found herself outside the Union after the
passage of the Congressional Reconstruation Acts.
If the conditions for the re-admission had been
somewhat tempered to meet the situation, the blow
might have been softened, but such was not the purpose of the northern Radicals who demanded the
"pound of flesh" instead of mercy.

If Congress

thought that the problems of reconstruction were
ended with the passage of the acts, it was sadly
mistaken; they had only begun.
Conditions in the South caused by this Congress
can be summed up as follows:

The states were declared

to be outside the Union and their existing State
governments were declared to be inadequate as well as
illegal;

military rule was imposed upon the "rebels"

until a satisfactory government could be arranged for
each state; and, the right of suffrage was conferred
upon the freedmen, but withheld from a large class
1

of whites.
1.

~4!?n.r..l Steele Commager, Documents of American History,
F. S. Crofts & Co. New York 1934 Vol. II 30-51.
48

49

Shortly after the enactment of the reconstruction measures, the President assigned General Ord
to the command of the fourth military district,
2

embracing the states of Mississippi and Arkansas.
It was the General's duty to maintain order and to
register the loyalists for the new electorate, and
since the latter was by far the more important duty,
it was undertaken at once.

Registration boards were

formed of those who could swear that they had not
voluntarily borne arms against the United States,
which automatically eliminated almost all of the
native shites, "and the posts were subsequently
filled by freedmen, military officers, and ex-union
3

soldiers who had settled in the South after the war".
These boards, beginning their canvass early in June,
were empowered to register as legal voters only those
male citizens who were twenty one years of age and
who could claim one year residency in the State.

By

law, each applicant had to swear that he had not been

2.
3.

James Wilford Garner, Reconstruction in Mississippi,
The MacMillan Company, New York, 1901, 161.
Ibid., 172.
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a member of any state legislature, nor held any
executive or judicial office after which he had
engaged in rebellion against the United States,
or given aid or camfort to its enemies; that he
had never taken an oath as a member of Congress
or as an officer of the United States, or

a~

a

member of any state legislature or as an executive
or judicial officer of any state, to support the
Constitution of the United States, and afterwards
engaged in insurrection against it, or given aid or
4

comfort to its enemies.

In effect these stringent

requirements disqualified most of the prominent and
influential white citizens, and when the registration
was completed the Negroes were found to have a
5
of 20,000.

ma~ority

This survey of the 'voters revealed, as nothing
else had done, the real political situation into
which civil war and reconstruction were fast forcing
the whites.

It was now plain that the management of

their political affairs, which they had formerly

4.
5.
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looked upon as theirs by right, must soon pass to
their late slaves, together with strangers from
the North.

Many declared that the state was no

longer fit for white men, and some even prepared to
6
migrate to other states.
The ground work was completed, and now General
Ord made plans for an election to determine whether
the electorate was in favor of a constitutional convention, the preliminary step necessary for the establishment of civil government and readmission of
the state to the Union, or whether they preferred
to remain under military rule and without representation in Congress.

An election to settle this ques-

tion was ordered for the first Tuesday in November,
1867, and at the same time delegates to the convention
7
were to be elected.

6.

7.

It is interesting to note in this connection the
political status of the negro in the Northern
States: In only six states was he given the
right to vote, and any participation in state or
civil administration was, for the most part,
simply denied him. But now the North was forcing
not only negro suffrage, but also negro rule upon
her sister states. James Ford Rhodes, History of
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Pre-election days say much activity on the
part of the whites as they earnestly tried to decide upon the most favorable course of action to
follow during the coming election.
furthered.

Two plans were

There were those who thought that the

government was being re-established on principles
abhorrent to their traditional ideas of popular
government, and that those who favored such reconstruction had little consideration for the welfare of
the Mississippians.

'.L'hey were convinced that the

best way to show their disapproval was to decline all
participation in

the work of reconstruction and by

their protest to defeat the reconstruction convention.
This they could easily do by refusing to vote,

be-

cause the approval of a majority of the registered
voters had to be secured before the convocation of
8

such an assembly.

'l'hese men, few in number, main-

tained that Congress had reduced the people to utter
ruin, and had contriced the perpetuation of negro
rule, which meant that the Southern States were

8.

Ibid.!

178
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foredoomed to become African provinces.

They

and their children were to be held in negro subjection.

It is to the credit of the Mississippians

that very few rallied around this standard.
Another view, entertained by a respectable
minority of the leading politicians and editors,
maintained that it was the duty of the whites to
register, vote for a convention, and in every
possible way assist in the reconstruction of the
state.

'l'hey saw clearly that there was no escape

from negro domination, and that a policy of sullen
inactivity would increase the predjudices of the
Radicals in Congress.

To accept the reconstruction

policy as cheerfully as their pride would permit
could not make their situation any worse, and it
would perhaps be the means of securing concessions
from the radicals in Congress.

Their support was,

of course, not outspoken advocacy of the reconstruction
9

measures, but mere acquiescence.
Still another party, the Republican party, came

9.

Ibid.,

178-179.
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into being during these months of reconstruction.
In September the first Republican convention in the
state was held at Jackson, and its roster included
about one third freedmen, and the rest were election
registrars, bureau agents and Northerners who had
10
recently taken up residence in the State.
They
adopted a platform endorsing all the principles of
the national party and declared that the Mississippi
Republicans would keep step with it in all the progressive political reforms of the age.

They endorsed

the congressional plan of reconstruction and promised
to use their best efforts in extending the benefits
of free education to every child in the state, and
to give the ballot to every man not disfranchised
for crime, including treason; they declared that
they would never recognize any distinction based on
11
race or color.

10.
11.

Ibid., 180
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Support for the newly founded party was
solicited through the efforts of the secret
12
politioal organization, The Loyal League.
Unsorupulous military authorities and northern
politicians used this society as a lever by whioh
they were to bring the entire oolored vote into the
Republioan party.

The organization was introduced

into the South by the Whigs and ex-soldiers of the
Union Army.

Negro councils were formed, and the

inorease of membership soon gave the oolored people
a monopoly of the league in the South.

Though the

majority of the members were Negroes, the League was
guided in politioal matters by the carpetbag element.

12.
13.
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Publishing House, Uleveland, 17-20.
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The popularity of this organization was
due in large measure to the Freedmen Bureau.
By the use of such instruments it was not hard
for the Republican leaders to corral the negro
votes.

"It was hhis order, dominated by a few

radical whites, which organized, disciplined,
and controlled the ignorant negro masses and
paralyzed the influence of the conservative
14
'rhe power of this Loyal League knew
whites."
no bounds and its mandates were law to the Negro.
Death was the extreme punishment for any member
repeatedly voting the Democratic ticket.

All

candidates were nominated by the League and no
member could vote for a candidate not endorsed
by the secret society without incurrihg the wrath
15
of the League.
The Loyal League was a secret, oath-bound
organization, and its roster

14.
15.
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Walter Lynmood Fleming, The Sequel of Appomattox, Yale University Press, New Haven,
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Negro from 18 to 70 years, and every white man
who would take the oath.

While only a few whites

joined the League, nearly all the male Negroes
eligible for membership were initiated into its
16
mysteries.
After the initiation ceremonies, the
new member was obliged to swear on the holy bible
the following oath:
I, •• • , do solemnly swear on the holy
bible, in the presence of God and these
witnesses, that I will ever remain true
and loyal to the Republican party; that I
will always vote the Republican ticket;
that I will keep secret all the signs, pass
words and grip of the Loyal League; that I
will obey all the laws, rules, resolutions
and commands of the League of which I am
a member; that I will forever reverence
the name and memory of Abraham Lincoln,
the author and father of my freedom,
that I will observe and keep holy remembrance
each anniversary of the Emancipation Broclamation, and that I will teach my children to
do so ••••
That I will never knowingly vote for any
Democrat, for any office, lest I be put
back into bondage and slavery ••••
For a violation of this oath, or any part
of it, for the first offense I agree to
receive fifty lashes on my bare back, and
one hundred lashes for the second offense;
and for the third, to be secretly shot to
death by any member of the League appointed
for that purpose. So help me God. l7
16.
17.
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Such were the political trends as November
drew near, and in the election the question was
decided when the reconstructionists carried the
state by a large majority.

'J.'he great mass of

whites took no part in the election, but chose
to let it go by default.

In pursuing this course

they made a great mistake, one that bore bitter
fruit in the subsequent months; by their lethargy
they allowed the Radicals to secure a large majority
18
of the delegates in the convention.
The stage was set and on January 9, 1868, the
curtain was drawn on the reconstruction convention
19
known as the "Black and Tan Convention tt •
This
was the first, and by no means the last, political
body in Mississippi in which the negro race was
represented, and a poor representation they made,
for most of them were without education, and none
of them had ever held pUblic office.

The colored,

together with the carpetbag element and the white
republicans, derisively called "Scalawags", by far

18.
19.

Rhodes, 90.
J. G. Randall, The Civil War and Reconstruction,
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outnumbered the conservatives, and naturally
20
ruled the sessions.
The keynote of the convention was struck
by the ohairman in the introductory address in
whioh he reminded the delegates that the longlooked for hour had come at last, and that to
the viotors belonged the spoils.

That it was

not hard to oonvince the assemblage of this fact
is quite evident for as the first item on the
agenda was compensation for the oonvention delegates and employees.

Excessive salaries were

agreed upon as if in oonfirmation of their belief
that they had a legitimate right to exploit the
taxpayers to any extend they pleased.

Of those

voting for this measure less than twelve were
owners of property in Mississippi, and therefore

20.

~hirty

two of the sixty one counties of the
state had negro majority and were given
seventy delegates, while thetwenty nine white
counties were given but thirty. II'here were
seventeen colored delegates, nineteen conservatives, twenty from the carpetbag element,
and twenty nine native white republicans.
Hhodes, 90.
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21
subject to the tax.

But this was not the only

golden egg that the goose was to lay.

Other bills

were introduced and passed which alloted fabulous
amounts to individuals and committees for traveling
expenses, stationery and other such "necessities".
To defray the enormous expenses incurred by the convention the finance committee was instructed to frame
an ordinance for levying a tax upon real and personal
property in the state.

Naturally the burden fell

upon the shoulders of those who received so little
consideration

a~

the hands of the convention - the

rebel whites, while the so called loyalists hardly
contributed enough to pay the door-keeper and pages
22
of the convention.
It was inevitable, under the circumstances
of the situation, that the radical ideas,
social and economic as well as political,
should be strongly represented among the
members of the convention. Southern
Unionists, in whom rankled the memories
of long oppression and ostracism, ambitious
Northerners, filled with ideals of a new
South modeled on the lines of New England,
and negroes, less than three years out of
slavery, ware the classes numerically most

21.
22.

Garner, 189
Ibid., 197
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important in the conventions. Moderation
was hardly to be anticipated from any of
these. 23
Drunk with power, the convention made a bold
attempt to control all the state offices.

by a bill,

the convention was to be given full power to "declare
all civil offices vacant" and co-extensive with this,
the power to make all appointments so that "offices
might be filled by men of known loyalty."

24

out and out radicalism the test of loyality.

It was
Fortu-

nately the Democrats were able to muster enough
strength to defeat the measure, but their attempt
to block such legislation in the future was vehemently
25

voted down.
So engrossed were the rulers of the convention
in grabbing all they could, that it was several weeks
before the formation of a state constitution, the
real work of the convention, was taken up.

A committee

was then appointed to prepare a constitution, and a
report was made in three days, but it was several
23.
24.
25.

William Archibald Dunning, Essays on the Civil
War and Reconstruction, MacMillan Company, New
York:-r910, 194.
Garner, 191.
Ibid.,
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months before agreement was reached on the disputed
points.

'lihe main bone of contention concerned
26
qualifications for suffrage and office.
A strong

effort was made by the minority to secure the adoption
of a provision that would exclude from the franchise
the great mass of the ignorant blacks, but, however
strong their arguments may have been, they made little
impression upon the delegates.

When the franchise

article was passed by a large majority, twelve of the
27
white delegates withdrew from the convention.
The franchise article, as finally adopted, required applicants for registration to subscribe to the
test oath laid down by the reconstruction act of
28
March 23,
and swear further that they accepted the
civil and political equality of all men.

Candidacy

for public offices was restricted to those who had
neither voted for the secession convention nor in any
29
way aided the dause of the confederacy. This was

26.
27.
28.
29.

Randall, 790
Garner, 201
Commager, 38
Garner, 202.
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meant to be the death warrant of the demooratio
party.

Before adjourning, the oonvention made

elaborate plans for submitting the oonstitution to
the people for ratifioation.

At the same time pro-

vision was made for the eleotion of state offioers
as well as members of the legislature and members
of Congress.

A oommittee of five was also appointed

to whom was granted the authority to enforoe the
reoonstruotion aots until suoh time as the state
legislature should assume oontrol.

In the event

that the oonstitution were defeated this oommittee
30
was empowered to reassemble the oonvention.
The program of the oonvention had hardly been
determined when the friends and opponents of the
oonstitution began to marshal their foroes for the
~he

contest that was evidently brewing.

republioan

state oonvention was held and in the nominations the
oolored raoe was oompletely ignored sinoe all the
plaoes were taken by Northerners.
against suoh treatment of the

In loud protest

~egroes

who oonstituted

ninty-nine one-hundreths of the republioan votes, a

30.

Ibid., 208
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well educated negro leader, Rev. Fitz:hugh, urged
his fellows to join hands with the Southern whites
and bid defiance to the carpetbaggers.

~uch

men,

he claimed, "garged in the disguise of friends to
us are imposters ••• "

He withdrew from the party

declaring it to be "ruinious to the Union and an
31
His cry, however, fell on
enemy of the black."
deaf ears.
The Democrats, faced with utter extinction made
a desperate attempt to unite the whites in opposition
to the constitution.

Nieetings were held until finally

a unified program was adopted.

They denounced the

radicals and declared that the only hope for the restoration of their constitutional rights lay in the
defeat of the state constitution.

A state ticket was

nominated but only as a matter of form.

'lhey knew

that their mem would never hold office for if they
won the election, the constitution would be defeated
and military rule would continue, and if they lost
the election, the Republicans would continue to rule.
The cause of the Democrats was greatly helped as the
proscriptive character of the constitution became more
31.

Ibid.

208
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generally understood.
The election of June 22, 1868, brought joy to
the whites, but consternation and gloom to the radicalsj to both parties, in truth, it was a surprise
32
for the constitution was overwhelmingly defeated.
The Republicans moved quickly to save face and to
have the election declared a Republican victory in
33
spite of the election returns.
'I'he committee
applinted by the convention now became an investigation committee, and after months of feigned investigating, declared that the constitution had been ratified and adopted by the majority of the legal votes
cast, and that the Republican state ticket was duly
34
elected.
They were able to make such a decision
32.

33.

34.

"Only in Mississippi was ratification of the new
constitution defeated by a majority of the votes
cast."
William Archibald Dunning, Reconstruction,
Political and Economis, Harper and Brothers,
New York, 1907, 118.
The election results showed that the constitution
was defeated by seven thousand votes, and that
the Democratic candidates had secured four out
of the five seats in Congress, and that the
Democratic Governor had won by an eight thousand
majority. Garner, 216.
Randall, 791.
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because they rejected the votes from "white
counties" on the score that they were the results
of fraud and intimidation.

"The audacity of the

proclamation shows the desperation to which they
(the Republicans) were reduced.

.There was not a

shadow of authority for the extraordinary action
35
of the committee".
A Republican convention was quickly assembled
and a committee appointed to proceed to Washington
to lay before Congress the problem of Mississippi,
and urge the reasmission of the state.

In all their

dealinss, it was taken for granted that the state
constitution was duly ratified.

It was not until

after the inauguration of President Grant in 1869
that definite action was taken to end the existing
situation.

The Mississippi problem was taken from

the hands of the state committee and placed in those
of the National Reconstruction Cownittee.

A bona

fide investigation was then launched and the results
soon placed in the hands of the President.

35.

Garner, 220.

It was
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unanimously agreed that the election had been conducted fairly and that many Negroes had voted voluntarily with the whites.
the National

Co~~ittee

It was the opinion of

that the constitution was

defeated fairly, and if another were submitted with
the proscriptive clauses omitted, it would be ratified.

~he

president concurred in this opinion and

Congress authorized the submission of the constitution
36
to the popular vote.
In preparing for the fall election, the political parties in Mississippi broke asunder.

The Repub-

lican party was now divided into conservative and
radical elements, with the Negroes for the most part
adhering to the latter.

Separate conventions were

held and separate platforms adopted expressing the
two extreme opinions.

The outlook of the Democrats

was anything but encouraging, as it was evident
that they had not the strength to win the election.
In a last attempt to defeat the radical program a
movement was set afoot to unite the Democrats with
the conservative Republicans.

In this arrangement

lay the salvation of the state, but too many Democrats
36.

Randall, 191.
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with the conservative Republicans.

In this arrange-

ment lay the salvation of the state, but too many
Decocrats were too proud to join forces and they
broke from the apron strings of the mother party.
37
This was a disastrous mistake.
In the election on November 30, 1869, the
constitution was ratified almost unanimously, but
the so-called proscriptive clauses submitted separately were rejected by an overwhelming majority.
'l'he Republican party made a clean sweep of the
national as well as the state offices, since the
colored vote was cast almost solidly for the radical
program.

Throughout the election was controlled

by the Republicans.

In spite of the fact that the

Republican ticket was backed by the National Administration, that a large number of the whites were dis38
franchised-- two potent factors which all but guaranteed Republican landslide-- the leaders of the radical party resorted to underhanded methods to win
their election.
37.
38.

Election laws were deliberately

Garner, 237-244.
It mas been estimated that about 15,OOOv'ihites
had been disfranchised by the Reconstruction
Acts. Garner, 246.
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framed to open the way for manipulation and
fraud; the number of Negroes registered at the
polls far outnumbered those eli,gible for voting;
votes were bought and sold; the Democratic vote
of a Negro was contested; fraudulent votes were
placed in the ballot boxes before the polls were
opened; the Republican returning board "juggled
election returns ••• and in some cases merely esti39
mated what the votes ought to have been".
The
entire election was characterized as a "comedy of
40
blunders and frauds".

39.
40.

Randall 847-848
H. C. Warmoth, War, Politics and Reconstruction,
225, as quoted by Randall, 848. For other
election abuses in the Southern States, cf.
Walter Lynwood Flemming, Documentary History
of Reconstruction, The Arthur H. Clark Company
-,-Cleveland, 1907, Vol. II 44-46, 81-93. Though
the articles listed in this account do not pertain explicitly to Mississippi, yet in general
the methods adopted in one state were likewise
employed in the others.
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But Congress had at last won the day, much
against the will of the Mississippians.

Bitter

though the scheme had been, salvation was at last
in sight, for the state would be admitted to the
Union, and the people would again have the right
to hold their own elections.

·J.;he right of self

government was in sight, but the intervening years
before Democratic supremacy could be established
were bitter ones for the white men as well as for
the Negroes.
On the 23rd of February, 1870, by act of
Congress, Mississippi was officially restored to
41
the Union and military rule was withdrawn.
Mississippi had in every way complied with the
demands of Congress, but in so doing the welfare
of its citizens was sacrificed to the whims of the
carpetbaggers.
bitter fruit.

41.

The tree of civil strife was bearing
This was CongreSSional Reconstruction.

Dunning, Essays on the Civil War and Reconstruction, 235, 237:---- ---

CHAPTER V
ALCORN AND PffirERS
Secession and four years of war destroyed
the government of the Southern States. Two
years of presidential effort failed to
restore them. 'J.~hree years of Congressional
Reconstruction brought into being, by the
summer of 1870, governments at last acceptfble
to National authority in all its branches.
To all intents and purposes, Congress was at
last satisfied.

But the new structure of Mississippi's

government was built upon ill-will, greed and corruption,
and no sooner had the finishing touches been given than
the magnificient edifice began to crumble.
In truth, there was in the government small
strength of its own- a few men, white and
black, who saw in it the hope of a new day;
many men who saw in it fairer opportunities
than they had known before of political
preferment or public plunder; a vast mass
of ignorant voters, grateful to "the government"
for what it had done for them, and disposed to
follow those who could connect themselves with
the great dispenser of good gifts. 2
The strength of the reconstructed government came from
wi thout, not from wi thin.

'l'he Congressional plan waS

not devoid of weakness, and it was not able to withstand
the political stress of the next few years.

1.
2.

Robert Selph Henry, The Story Q! Reconstruction, The
Bobbs-Merrill Company, New York, 1938, 401.
Ibid.
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With much ado, General Ames announced the
results of the fall election:

James L. Alcorn

and his Republican cohorts rode into power on a
30,000 majority.

Accompanying this announcement an

order was issued making the election effective immediately.

But as Governor Alcorn refused to assume

office until the following March, the time appointed
by Congress, General Ames called for a provisional
legislature to meet inJanuary, 1870, to complete once
and for all the reform required for final restoration.
The legislative assembly of January 11, 1870,
was unusual in many respects.

In this once Democratic

controlled state, only seven of the thirty-three senators
and twenty-five of the one-hundred-and-seven representati ves were De.ll!lOcrats.

'.I.'he remaining seats were filled

by Republicans of various factions and cliques - Negroes,
3

"carpetbaggers" and "scalawags".

The "scalawags"

those native whites who from principle or policy had
allied themselves with the Republican party - were the
most abhorred by the people - Governor Alcorn being
no exception.

The "carpetbaggers" - the leeches from

David H. Donald, The Restoration of Home Rule in
Mississippi, 1863-1890, M. A. Thesis, University
of Illinois, 1942, 2.
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the North who came to bleed the South - were the
most distrusted.J:he Negroes - slaves of a few
years back - were most unequal to the authority
4

invested in them.

These unwelcomed and dreaded

elements constituted the majority, and they controlled the organization of the legislature, shaped
the legislation, and established the public policy
5

of the state".
General Ames requested of this assembly in no
uncertain terms the ratification of the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments - pre-requisites for final
6

restoration.

No choice was given the delegates

because by Congressional action slavery had already
been abolished and the civil rights of the negroes
guaranteed.

4.

5.
6.

The ratification of the amendments,

John Seymore McNeilly, "War and Reconstruction
in MisSissiSPi 1863-1890" in Mississippi
Historicalociety Publications: Centenary Series,
II, 382.
James Wilford Garner, Reconstruction in Mississippi,
The MacMillan Company, New York, 1901, 2700
Ibid, 270-271
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strangely enough, was sweet revenge for the Democrats.

~hey

gloried "in seeing the poisoned

chalice carried to the lips of those who had forced
7

it on the South."

Those Northern states, which as

yet refused to recognize the civil and political
rights of the Negroes, were made the victims of
their own scheming.
The other important accomplishment of the provisional legislature was the appointment of their
own United States Senators.

Governor Alcorn was

chosen to fill the full term beginning March 4, 1871,
while General Ames and Rev. Hiram Revels, a negro,
were chosen for the unexpired terms.

8

The legislature

could now adjourn and await congressional action.
Mississippi was now a broken state.

Her citizens

had been forced to swallow their pride and submit to
negro rule.

If this were not enough, Congress demanded

that every requirement be strictly complied with before
admission to the Union.

7.
8.

The conditions imposed were

McNeilly, 383
John R. Lynch, The Facts of Reconstruction, ~he
Neale Publishing Company, New York 1913, 44-47.
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like salt on an open wound, but Mississippi
conformed.

Notwithstanding, there were men

in Congress who demanded still more.

These

men would not accept Mississippi until the
members of the new legislature had taken the
9

oath prescribed in the Virginia Bill.

Further-

more, the Butler Bill was introduced which deprived
Mississippi of equality with the other states in
the Union, and even went so far as to deny the
state the right to change its organic law in
10
For weeks Congress debated,
certain respects.
and when a more lenient bill failed to please the
Radicals, the

Butler Bill was finally passed in

utter desperation.

On February 23, President

Grant signed the bill and Mississippi was no longer
11
on the outside looking in.

9.

10.
11.

Walter Lynwood Flemming Documentary History
of RecQnstruction, The Arthur h. Clark Company,
Cleveland 1907, Vol. I, 488-490.
Ibid. ,
Garner, 273.
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At long last civil government was restored.
General Ames, before resigning his command in
favor of a seat in the United States Senate,
turned over the reins of the government to Governor
Alcorn and the state legislature.

On March 10,

1870, the governor was sworn into office before the
assembled delegates, and in his inaugurial address
12
he promised peace and prosperity to the Mississippians.
How sadly mistaken he was--there waS to be neither
peace nor prosperity.
~he

delegates to the new state Congress faced

important and difficult tasks.Lhe state government
had to be reorganized thoroughly; a new judiciary
had to be inaugurated, consisting of three Justices
of the Supreme Court, fifteen Judges of the Circuit
Court and twenty Chancery court Judges, all of whom
were to be appointed by the new Governor with the
13
Needless to say, the lion's
consent of the Senate.
share of these offices was given to southern men who

12.
13.

Ibid., 277-281
Garner, 283
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were affiliated with the Republican party--in
14
other words, to "scalawags".
Following this adjustment much time waS spent
in establishing a new public school system which
would care for the children of both races.

The few

school buildings that remained after the destruction
of the war were badly in need of repair.

The initial

financial outlay to repair and build schools was
great, and taxation soared.

nut the constitution

had provided for such an elaborate sohooling system,
15
and, of course, the work had to be done.
Finally
action was taken to preserve the oivil rights of the
Negro.

~he

Black Code and the code of 1857 were

repealed; Negroes were recognized as eligible for
jury service, and it was declared illegal to discriminate against the colored in any public conveyance
16
or in any public gathering.
Though the first session of the new legislature
lasted over six months, there was not time enough to
14.
15.
16.

Garner, 283.
Lynch, 33-34
Garner, 285-286.
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reorganize the state government.

'l'he second

session was called for January 3, 1871.

'l'he

financial report of the first assembly overwhelmed
the poor taxpayers.

Pay and expenses of the legis-

lature that year were over two hundred and fifty
thousand dollars, considerably more than three times
the highest figure recorded by any

~-bellum

lature.I ? And this item was considered minor.

legisIn 1870

Mississippi had only six hundred dollars of dependable
assets in her treasury and nearly eight hundred thousand
dollars in worthless paper, but this was of no consideration to the over generous legislature.

Their

program of expenditure "would have done credit to a
18
commonwealth of assured wealth and prosperitytt.
For the year 1870, only $436,000 were collected by
the state treasurer yet the disbursements exceeded the
19
This was a period of economyl January
million mark.
3, 1871, saw the beginning of a new legislature.

Six

months had now elapsed, yet the business at hand had
not changed.
17.
18.
19.

An attempt was made to control taxation

Henry, 409.
Dunbar Rowland, History of Mississippi, S. J.
Clark Publishing Company, Chicago, 1925, Vol. II,
163.
Ibid., 164
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and to lighten the burden shouldered for the
most part by the Democrats.

l.lthe proposal to

revise the assessments met with no success because it was declared unconstitutional and there20
fore abandoned.
Since the Apportionate Act of Congress entitled
Mississippi to a sixth representative, a revision of
the Congressional districts was necessary.

Two

plans were proposed, one to arrange the distriots
so that all would have a Republioan majority, though
in two of them the difference would be slight and
election doubtful.

The other to arrange the dis-

tricts so that five would be solidly Republican and
21

one Demooratio.

The latter plan was adopted in

order to assure Republican victory in five out of
the six districts.
Financial matters were not helped by the new
legislature, for instead of retrenching,more money
was appropriated.

Higher education received an

impetus at the cost of over one hundred thousand
20.
210

Donald, 14.
Lynch, 66-70.
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dollars,

while the railroads also received a
23

liberal allotment.

State taxation to meet the

expenditures had increased four times over that of
24
1869 and was to increase still more.
Such in
brief was the financial legislation.

When on May

3 the legislature adjourned, the Republicans were
in favor of longer and more frequent sessions,
declaring that the legislative needs demanded them.
The Democrats, however, claimed that "the per diem
25
method of compensation was the true reason".
'Ilhe Federal government at this time' was not
inactive either.

Racial disorder in the early part

of 1871 led the Northerners to doubt the sincerity
of the Southern Whites.

22.
23.
24.
25.

Rowland, 166
Garner, 288-289.
Flemming, 71
Garner, 289

The secret organization,
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26

the Ku Klux Klan,

was "an answer to the Union

League, a foil to the carpetbaggers and a means of
27
suppressing the negro militia."
It was unfortunate, though, that the Klan was controlled by nefarious men who resorted to cruel and terrorizing activities.

Had it been properly governed, it could have

been a fair instrument to protect the whites against
negro aggression.

As it was, however,

Whatever credit the Klan may have had
as a champion of the southern white
was marred by the irresponsible and 28
unscrupulous methods which it used.
But to the credit of the South it must be said that
the Klan by no means had popular support.

In Mississ-

ippi the activity of the hooded riders was centered
along the eastern boarders, and in the other parts
29
of the state little was known of it.
The racial

26.

27.

28.
29.

Walther Henry Cook, Secret Political Societies
in the South during the Period of Reconstruction,
Evangelical Publishing House, Cleveland, 21-29.
J. G. Randall, The Civil War and Reconstruction,
D. C. Heath Company, New York, 1937, 854.
Ibid., 855
For the activity of the Ku Klux Klan, of Garner,
338-353.
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boil came to a head in Mississippi on March 6,
30
1871, the day of the Meridian riot.
Though
quickly lanced, the soreness remained.

The threat

of recurrence gave the northern radicals and carpetbaggers an effective tool whereby they tightened
their control of the South.
The racial situation was referred to President
Grant in a somewhat exaggerated report.

When he

concluded that Mississippi, as well as the other
Southern States, was not able to cope with the problem
he directed Congress to intervene.

Congressional

action took form in the Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20,
31
1871,
the third of the so called Enforcement Acts.
Congress passed the first and second acts of this
series to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment by guaranteeing the right of the negroes to vote and provided
heavy penalties where anyone "by force, bribery or
intimidation" should hinder or prevent a citizen
32
from fulfilling his duty.
The third act

30.
31.
32.

Rowland, 169-172.
Flemming, 123-128
Ibid., 102-111,112-123.
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was directed against the activities of the Ku
Klux Klan.

Its method of operation was declared

criminal and, severe penalties were levied against
anyone who would henceforth participate in any Klan
disturbance.

~he

President was given the power to

suspend the habeas corpus privilege, and the right
to intervene with federal troops.

Thus the death

knell was sounded for the Klan, and in the middle of
33
1871 its existence virtually came to an end.
Though southern whites agreed that drastic
action had to be taken, they could not understand
the manner in which it was done.

The Act was passed

on April 20, 1871, but Congressional investigation
did not begin until June 8, and was not completed
34
until August 4 of the same year.
This surely was
putting the cart before the horse.

33.
34.

Randall, 174.
Rowland, 174.
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Logically the Congressional investigation
should have preceded the enforcement act,
the reverse of the order was equivalent
of hanging first and trying afterwards.
Logically, after the act was passed, on
the presumption of guilt of the late
insurrectionary states, there was no
reason for the investigation •. Logic, 35
however, gave way to partisan strife.
Eleven years after the passage of this act it was
declared unconstitutional by the United States
36

Supreme Court,

but before this decision, Mississippi

had felt the full force of the legislation.
By the end of 1871 state and federal troops
succeeded in maintaining good order apart from
occasional outbursts.

It became evident at last

that the hostility of the people was not directed
against the Federal Administration, but the state
government.

Even in Washington the fair minded

Republicans began to see through the smoke screen.

35.

John S. McNeilly, "Enforcement Act of 1871 and
the Klu Klux Klan in Miss. in the Miss. Hist.
Soc. Publications XVIII, 109-171
James OE'ord Rhodes, History of the United States J
The MacNI.illan Company, London, 1909, Vol. VI, 316.
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The light was breaking upon the Republican
leaders whose souls were not steeped in
partisan passions, and they were commencing
to see that the Southern States ridden by
carpetbaggers and ignorant negroes, were
rebelling against intolerable state rule
rather than against the government of the
United States. 37
The growing discontent among the northerners came
to a climax with the congressional debacle.

Political

pressure was brought to bear upon President Grant and
he promptly asked Congress on December 4, 1871 to
remove, with a few exceptions, the disabilities imposed by the fourteenth amendment.
Congress would have complied with the wishes of
the Chief Executive had it not been for the radical
Sumner, who agitated against the Amnesty bill.
Bill, as submitted, was rejected because of
Rights rider tacked on by Sumner.

'l'he

the~vil

In January 1872

it was again proposed, and rejected for the same
reason.

It was not until the

~my

session that the

bill was submitted without the odius amendment, and
it was passed immediately by an almost unanimous vote.

37.
38.

Rowland, 175.
Rhodes, 325-329.
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The Anmesty Act of 1872 is a bright light in the
reconstruction legislation of Congress and marks an
advance toward a sounder policy than that which had
prevailed.

It provided:

'llhat all political disabilities imposed by
the third section of the fourteenth article
of amendment of the constitution of the
United States are hereby removed from all
persons whomsoever, except Senators and
Representatives of the 36th and 37th
Congresses, officers in the judicial,
military and naval service of the United
States, heads of departments, and foreigh
ministers of the United States. 39
Before this act, over 150,000 Southern whites had
been excluded from state and federal offices; the
Amnesty Bill reduced that number to less than 500.

40

Though these figures embrace all the confederate
states, nevertheless they shed an important light on
Mississippi's politics.
Prior to the passage of the Amnesty Act, James
Alcorn had resigned as governor of Mississippi to
serve as United State Senator.

Ridgely C. Powers,

then lieutenant governor, piloted the ship for the

39.
40.

Flemming, 431.
Rhodes, 329.
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three remaining years.
November 30, 1871.

He assumed oontrol on

It has been said of him that

of all the oarpetbaggers in Mississippi he was
41
"the most popular and most respeoted tt •
His task
was a diffioult one, and though he was a perfeotly
honest and just man, nevertheless he was walled in
on every side by oorruption.

~he

State Congress at

this time was busily engaged in promoting oostly
railroad plans.

The pages of its journal are marred

also by the Printing Bill of 1872, both examples of
42
greed and open fraudo
The eleotion of 1872, however, manifested the
sinoerity of the new Governor.

ihe popular vote for

the presidenoy gave Grant a 35,000 majority, and the
Republioans swept all the representative offioes
exoept one.

Luoius Q. C. Lamar, a Demoorat, was

eleoted to the United States Consress by a 5,000

41.
42.
43.

Rowland, 176.
Donald, 27-29.
Rowland, 178.
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major~ty
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At the time of the election, Lamar was not eligible
for the office, since he was a former member of the
Congress of the U. S. and the Confederate States,
colonel in the Confederate Army, and diplomatic
representative of the Confederacy abroad.

Neverthe-

less Governor Powers and other Republican leaders
petitioned Congress to reinstate Colonel Lamar by
having his political disabilities removed.

The quali-

fications established by the Fourteenth Amendment were
set aside in his regard by a special act of congress
44
and Lamar was seated without objection.
The year 1873 brought to Mississippi a long and
bitter political campaign.

The November election was

to determine the incumbents of State, district and
county offices.

'l'he beginning of trouble came when

the constitutionality of the November election was
contested.

The Attorney General of :Mississippi claimed

that since the state Was not admitted to the Union
until February, 1870, and since the tenure of office
was four years, the general election was not due until

44.

Henry, 472.
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November 1874.

Governor Powers addressed a

special session of congress to this effect, but
the delegates decided that the first political year
after the reconstruction was inaugurated by the
provisional legislature of January 1870.

This meant

that the election of state officials for 1874 was to
be held in November, 1873.
45
upheld this decision.

rI' he State Supreme Court

The battle field was dominated by two staunch
Republicans, the former military Governor, General
Ames, and ex-governor Alcorn, the former a carpetbagger, the latter a scalawag.

Both men represented

Mississippi in the United States Senate and jealousy
kept them at arms length.

Both claimed the headship

of the Republican state party and both sought its
nomination for the governorship.

The pendulum swung

in favor of General Ames and with great ease he secured the nomination at the state convention.

Alcorn

and his colleagues immediately bolted the party and
46
nominated a state ticket of their own.
Both candidates knew that the door to the governor's mansion
45.
46.

Rowland, 180.
Garner, 290-292.
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hinged on the negro vote.

Each ticket, consequently,

included three negroe rivals for the same officesthat of Lieutenant governor, Secretary of State and
47
Superintendant of Education.
This colored element
felt that they were not properly represented and
demanded what was later to be known as the "color line".
Numerically they were strong enough to enforce their
demands, but unfortunately competent men could not be
found to accept the nomination.

'l.'he outstanding ex-

ample of their rashness was to replace the competent
Superintendent of Education by a colored man "whose
48
chief qualification was the color of his skin."
'l'he Democrats were still too weak to offer much
opposition.

At the state convention held at Meridian,

it was deemed inexpedient to nominate a ticket of
their own, and after much deliberation, the majority
chose to support Alcorn, the lesser of two evils,
but contrary to expectation, Alcorn lost popularity
because of Democratic endorsement.

47.
48.

Lynch, 70-76.
Garner, 293.
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Thousands of Republicans who were in
sympathy with the movement, and who
would have otherwise voted the Alcorn
ticket, refused to do so for the reason
that if it were elected the Democrats 49
could claim a victory for their party.
Nor did all the Democrats ooncur in the decision of
the convention.

Many of that party refused to vote

for any Republican, while others, dissatisfied with
Alcorn's middle-of-the-road policy, cast their vote
for Ames.
The election went in favor of General Ames,
who

received almost the unanimous vote of the Negroes

because as military governor he had befriended them.
This support secured for him a majority of almost
20,000.

Of the governor elect it was said:
Neither in character nor in debate was
Ames a match for Alcorn, but the
results was a forcible demonstration
of the power of the radical machine
which was then so solidified and
ruthlessly managed. 50

The Governor-elect had as a working partner a Republican
dominated legislature for the party was able to maintain its two to one majority because it controlled the
negro votea.
49.

50.

In the Senate, the Negroes held one fifth

G¥nch, 76
Rowland, 179.
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of the seats, while in the House they held one
51
half.
This was just the beginning of the carpetbag regime which was to dominate Mississippi until
the Revolution of 18750

51.

Henry, 503

CHAPTER VI
THE CARPET-BAG REGIME
1874 - 1875
January 22, 1874, saw the inauguration of
IVlississippi 's new governor.

Governor Ames in his

address to the new delegates, pledged "retrenchment in expenditures and rigid economy".

1

His evi-

dent sincerity won for him the support of a large
number who had formerly looked upon him as nothing
more than a "damned yankee".

Though he promised to do

all in his power to reform the abuses existing in
every branch of the state and county government, what
he did not stop to consider was the temper of the new
legislature, which has been described as Uthe culmination of negro representation".

2

Lieutenant Governor

A. K. Davis, a Negro, presided over the senate, and
L. D. bhadd, also a negro, was chosen speaker of the
house.

The Republicans enjoyed a majority, and fore-

most in their minds was financial compensation and
personal aggrandizement.
10

2.

It was they who were to set

Dunbar Rowland, Encylopedia of Mississippi History,
Southern Historical Publication Association, Atlanta,
1907, Vol. I, 86.
Dunbar Rowland, History of Mississippi, S. J. Clark
Publishing Company, Chicago, 1925, Vol. II, 181.
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the tempo of legislation and thereby nullify
the good will of the Governor.
Governor Ames drew up a wise and practical
plan whereby state expenditures would be curtailed
and state taxation would be reduced in proportion
to the ability of the people to pay.

He advocated

retrenchment in every branch of the government,
and he insisted especially that the cost of the
legislature be reduced.

At that time the average

cost per day of that body was $1,800, and the
annual sessions cost the state over

~100,000.

Governor Ames urged a reduction in the per diem
rate, and, in place of the semi-annual sessions,
he urged bi-ennial sessions.

This proposal so

effected the pocket book of the legislators, with
the result that "the legislature to which these
recommendations were addressed did not seem to
3

favor reform".
Instead of retrenchment, excessive disbursements were the immediate result.

To meet their

needs, taxes were increased until they reached
3.

James Wilford Garner, Reconstruction in Iviississipp ,
The MacMillan Company,New York, 1901, 296-297.
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the highest ever to be levied in the state of
Mississippi.

In 1874, taxation was fourteen
4

times as great as it was in 1869.

In protest

to the heavy burden of taxes, the citizens formed
the State Grange and the Taxpayers' League whose
avowed purpose was to secure "equal and moderate
taxation; economical and lawful expenditures of the
public funds."

5

'l'hese organizations grew apace with

increased taxation and proved to be deciding factors
in the final overthrow of the greedy carpetbaggers.
The former organization at the state convention
held in January, 1874, resolved that:

4.
5.

Walter Lynwood Flemming, Documentary History
of Reconstruction, The Arthure H. Clark Company,
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Taxation in Mississippi has become a
burden so large and excessive that
the vital energies and industries of our
state are becoming sapped, paralyzed and
destroyed, and ruin inevitable and irretrievable stares us in the face. 6
At the taxpayers' convention, December 2, 1874,
a protest was drafted and sent to the legislature
wherein it was noted:
A careful estimate shows that during these
years of increasing and most extravagant
tax-levies, the public debt was increased
on an average annually over $664,000, a sum
sufficient to defray the entire expenses of
the government, economically administered.
That is, the state spent on an average this
large sum each year, over and above the
amount c~llected on those monstrous taxlevies.
These organized movements and formal protests,
however, had little effect upon the state legislature.
Expenditures continued to increase, the most outstanding of which were the $132,000 allotted to the
penitentiary, $82,000 for public printing, $153,000
for the lunatic asylum, $300,000 for education, and
~117,380

6.
7.
8.

8

for the legislature of that year.
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Finances, unfortunately, was not the only
major complaint against the misrule.

V'lhen

Governor Ames determined to seek the gubernatorial
office, it was his desire to later resign the honor
and to resume his place in the United States Senate.
His plan was thwarted by the election of A. K. Davis,
a negro, as Lieutenant Governor, and good sense
and practical judgment prevented him from abandoning the administration into the hands of such a
man.

Even so, Davis made every attempt to control

the government and assumed full authority the
.moment Governor Ames went North on vacation.
Twice in 1874 Davis seized such an opportunity
to act, and both times he "indulged in grotesque
extravagance and corrupt practices that fitly preluded the close of this dark chapter of the State's
history".

9

Shortly after adjournment of the legis-

lature in Spring, 1874, when Davis for the first
time assumed control, his first act was to discharge the governor's private secretary, and then
many of the employees of the government in order

9.

Ibid. ,
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to accommodate his own friends.

In positive

disregard of the appointments made by Governor
Ames, Davis made his own appointments of Chancellors
for several districts.

He did not stop here.

He

issued sixty-five pardons to his colored friends
in less than three months in which he enjoyed
10
authority.
That Governor Ames should place his
people at the mercy of the vicious and corrupt
negro, was appalling to all good citizens, and led
them to doubt the sincerity of the man they had
trusted.
This was not the only instance in which Governor
Ames betrayed the trust of his people.

His deter-

mined action in regard to the judiciary was criticised by friend and foe alike.

;l;he Judiciary of

Mississippi was made up of twenty circuit judges
and as many chancellors, the former holding office
for a period of six years, the latter for four,
by virtue of appointment by the Governor with the
consent of the senate.

Governor Alcorn had made

these appointments in 1870, consequently by the
10.

Garner, 298-299.
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spring of 1874 the offices of the chancellors would
be vacated and new appointments would be in order.
Governor Ames refrained from nominating their successors until after the adjournment of the senate,
and by so doing, those whom he eventually appointed,
held office by virtue of the Governorts consent alone.
Since he was solely responsible for their appointment,
he could likewise remove them from office'without the
consent of the senate.

'J.'his was an effectual means

of controlling the judiciary, of making it subservient to his own will,and thereby destroying its
11
independence.
There are two outstanding cases in which Governor
Ames used his power to control court decisions.

'J.'he

first instance was that of A. T. Morgan, a personal
'.

friend of the governor, who charged with murder and
arraigned before a chancellor, was committed to jail
and held without bail.

'rhis was not in accord with

the governorts wishes.

Ames straightway dismissed

the chancellor, as he oOuld do this since the appointment had not been confirmed by the senate, and appointed

11.

Ibid., 299-300
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another man to fill the vacancy. Morgan waS
12
forthwith released on bail.
The second instance was just as outstanding.

Uhancellor

Pe1 ton held office without confirmation, and when
he rendered a decision at variance with the governor's wishes, Ames refused to submit his name

to

the senate foT confirmation, though Peyton had held
13

office for almost a year.
By far tne most serious and well founded charge
ag~inst the governor in regard to the judiciary was

the appointment of incompetent men to judicial positio ns •

Some appointees were not even members of the

ba~ and were ignorant of both law and practice.

One

suo h person was so notoriously unfit for the position,

th~t the senate refused to confirm his appointment
14
even though he waS a member of their party.
In all appointments Governor Ames waS guided
by partisansb.iP, which more than restricted his
choice.

In a.. state, where the bar was dominated

al.r:JlOs t entirely by Democrat s, few others could be
fol.-l nd to fiLL the role of Judge.
Ibid., ~01-302

Ibid., 302.

I"bIQ:' •

3 04.

His choice was
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further limited by his refusal to appoint anyone
who might have any connection with the Alcorn wing
15
of the party.
At a time when the office of chancellor needed men of judicial training and integrity
because of its important and extensive jurisdiction,
failure to meet the requirements reflected badly
16
upon the administration.
The tune of the carpetbaggers was soon being
whistled by the Negroes.

As the former sought their

"pennies from heaven" in the more prominent state
offices, the latter were content to make the most of
the county offices.

Of the seventy three counties in

Mississippi in 1874, thirty four had a Republican
administration, and many of these were governed only
17
by Negroes.
'l'he office most coveted was that of
sheriff, because it offered the greatest opportunity
for pecuniary gain, and at the same time wielded the
most power.

The compensation for this office was, on

an average, $5,000, but it waS not uncommon for the
15.
16.
17.

Ibid., 304
Ibid.,
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fee to soar as high as $20,000 through bribes and
18
illegal transactions.
In the Republican controlled counties this office was filled by white
carpetbaggers, but where the colored voters maintained a majority, one of their own was elected.
In some cases the sheriff was sheriff in name only
because he had neither the ability nor the knowledge
to administer the office.

Under such circumstances,

the office was farmed out and the emoluments shared.

19

In these same counties the important office of
Justice of the Peace and the boards of supervisors
were filled by the unwanted element.

The former was

a law unto himself in the numberless cases of petty
offences; the latter were responsible for the rebuild20
ing of the wasted buildings, bridges and land.
It
was the county boards who controlled the assessment
and disbursement of taxes, supervised the roads, selected juries, awarded county contracts, examined and
determined upon the sufficiency of official bonds,
18.
19.
20.

Ibid., 182
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21
and negotiated loans.

These positions of so

great importance should have been administered
by men of unusual business ability, but instead,
they fell into the hands of the incompetent Negroes
22
who were guided by the Republican machine.
To meet the expenditures of the counties, the
people were taxed to the extreme in both Democratic
and Republican controlled districts.

Mississippi

had been impoverished by the war, its crops ruined
or damaged by floods and droughts, so that many men
were not able to meet the financial assessments.

In

many cases the taxpayers were forced to yield their
property to confiscation:
Over six million acres of land - one-fifth
of the area of the state - were forfeited
during this period, on account of the 23
inability of owners to pay the taxes.
As the burden had to be shouldered almost entirely by
the whites, this was an added grievance.

Almost one

half of the voters in 1874 were free from taxation
because they owned no real estate at that time.
21.
22.
23.
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Negroes, especially, were for the most part tax
eocempt.

Many If those who shared in the honor

and wealth of the lucrative state and county
offices contributed nothing to their own support.
There were many counties in which the blacks
did not pay $1,909 in taxes, yet they held
the majority of the offices and administered
the government. 24
What was true of the counties was also true of
the state.

'l'he Republican controlled legislature

was bitterly resented, not so much because of what
it was, but because of what it

did~

In five years

there had been nine sessions of the legislature contrary to the pledge of the Republican party.

Instead

of bi-ennial sessions promised, the legislature met
semi-annually, a practice which cost the state over
25
$100,000 a year.
The effort of the taxpayers'
league to introduce be-ennial sessions was blocked
by the colored vote.

As a compromise, however, the

delegates voted to limit the compensation to $500 a
year instead of the perdiem rate of $7.00 and 80t
24.
25.

Ibid., 314
Ibid., 325
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per "mile traveling expense.

This allowance was

still fantastic when compared with the compensation
26
granted in the northern states.
'l'he time for a showdown had come, and the men
of Vicksburg were the first to act.

Vicksburg and

Warren County were dominated by Negroes and into
their hands fell the majority of the political offices.

~hese

illiterate officials were mere

ftsatelites" under the control of corrupt and scheming
27
men.
Vicksburg especially was subjected to the
"corrupt and incompetent" administration.
The senators and representatives in the
legislature were colored, the sheriff could
not write a simple return and he was believed to be dishonest; the chancery clerk
was corrupt beyond doubt, and not intelligent
enough to enter a plain continuance on tbe
records; ,the circuit clerk and every member
of the board of supervisors except one were
colored, and scarce one of them could read
or write; and four of the eight councilmen of
Vicksburg were colored. In fact, there w~re
only three white officers in the county.2

26.
27.
28.
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The city government was sustained politically
by appeals, on the color line, to the non
tax-paying negroes, and supported financially
by tax-paying ~hites. 29
'l he resources of the whites were drained by the
i

heavy taxation which had increased during the
Reconstruction period from

~13,000

and this in a city of only 11,000.

to
30

~lJ400,000J

Ninety-nine

percent of the taxes were paid by the whites while
the taxes were "assessed, collected and disbursed
31
by colored officials."
Determined to put an end to the outrages once
and for all, the whites organized a tax-payers league
whose avowed purpose was to win the city election in
the fall of 1874.

The taxpayers who nominated re-

sponsible men under the name of the People's party,
were whole-heartedly supported by all the whites,
carpetbaggers and scalawags alike, and even by a
32
few Negroes.
Although the Republicans for their
part nominated a white man for mayor, a worse choice
could hardly have been made.

'.L'his nominee at the

time was under indictment for twenty three offences.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Henry, 529.
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~he

remainder of the ticket was equally bad.

Of

eight candidates for aldermen, they nominated
seven Negroes, while six of the eight school trustees,
and the city marshal were likewise colored.

'l'he

whites representing the ticket were of the "rank
carpetbag variety."

Such a ticket was revolting
34
to even hardened Republicans.
~he ticket was
so objectionable that eventually "but three white
35
The die was cast
men in the city voted for it".
and the August election was to be the acid test of
strength between the contending parties.
Weeks before the polls were opened, Vicksburg
lived in deadly fear of a riot.

White and black

militia made themselves very much in evidence, but
cool judgment kept them from acts of violence and
blood shed.

Governor Ames at this time was enjoy-

ing the cool breezes of the East Coast, and
Lieutenant Governor Davis who was faced with the
problem petitioned the United States Government
for troops, but was refused.
34.
35.

Ibid. ,
Garner, 329.

Governor Ames upon
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his return renewed the petition, but to no
avail.

His second appeal received the same

reply.

'.L'he administration was left to its own

poor resources.
Nothing illustrates better the imbecility
of the state government than the fact
that within three months after its inauguration it is found calling for United
States troops to maintain th p eace in a
town of 11,000 inhabitants.

56

The election of August 4 was "exciting but peaceable", and the reform ticket was elected almost t,o
37
'tIhe man.
The election proved one point conclusively:
the strength of the negro rule rested upon federal
support, and once this was removed the regime would
crumble.

'J.'he important lesson was never to be for-

gotten in Mississippi, and it was the sole reason
why race riots were not the order of the day.
Logically they figured that riots would bring
federal troops and federal troops would prolong
the misrule; consequently they did all that was
38
within their power to avoid acts of violence.
36.
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Before this lesson was learned by the
majorlty, however, there was trouble in Vicksburg
and Warren county.

The Reformers of the city

government would not rest satisfied until the
county offices were also purged.

Their immediate

attention was drawn to the most important office
in the county, the sheriff.
the extent of the corruption.

Investigation showed
Bonds that had been

posted were ridiculously insufficient; fraudulent
jury and witness certificates abounded; cQunty
warrents had been forged and circulated, and em39
bezzlement were outstanding.
Before the defendants could be brought to court, evidence against
them was

stolen from the court house. but waS

later found hidden away in the house of the chancery
40
clerk.
The taxpayers gathered in December to determine a course of action.

Taxes amounting to

$160,000 were due and were to be collected by
Crosby, and they demanded his resignation and that

39.
40.

Garner, 332.
Henry, 530.
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of the chancery clerk coroner, and other county
41
officials.
When Crosby refused to resign, he
was at once confronted by a mob of five hundred
who forcibly secured his resignation.

Crosby

protested and fled to Jackson to enlist the aid of
the Governor.
to fill

A white man was immediately appointed

the vacated office, and business continued.

Governor Ames declared the resignation null and void
and promised to reinstate Crosby by state troops if
42
nec.essary. and subsequently issued a proclamation
stating:
That riotous and disorderly persons had
combined to deprive colored men in
Vicksburg of their civil and political
rights. All such persons were warned
to disperse immediately. 43
The Negro militia was ordered by the governor to
accompany Crosby to Vicksburg, to reinstate him and
to supress the riot.

No appeal was made to the white

militia which was then in the city; in fact the commander of the negro unit, though of inferior rank, was
44
directed not to take orders from white officers.
41.
42.
43.
44.
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Crosby was intent upon regaining his office
and feared that the negro militia would be too
weak to enforce the will of

the governor, so

circulars signed by him were distributed throughout
45
the country,
and appeals were made for negro support in all the country churches.

'l'he march on

Vicksburg had begun..rne armed mob appeared outside
of the city on Monday, December ?, but the citizens
were not unprepared.

Martial law had been declared

by the Mayor and the supreme command delegated to an
46
ex-Confederate officer.
An attempt was made to
settle the dispute without bloodshed.

'l'he leaders

met in a parley and the Negroes agreed to withdraw.
Nobody knows why, but firing began on both sides.
In the riot that followed two whites and a score of
Negroes were killed.

Crosby, the ultimate cause of

the riotous gathering, deserted his followers when
4?
the shooting began. 'i.'his was the Vicksburg riot.

45.

46.
4?

Although Crosby denied writing such a proclamation,
it was later discovered that the circular was
written for him by a clerk in the office of the
Secretary of State. Rowland, History of l~lississipp ,
189.
Garner, 334.
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The riot, however, was short lived.

After

December 7 there were no more hostilities, and
peace was restored.

Nevertheless, the Governor

continued his demands for federal aid, and when
his requests were constantly refused, he called a
special session of the legislature to investigate
racial condition.

A joint resolution was introduced

which disregarded the power of the governor, and
petitioned the President for troops to nsuppress
domestic violences and restore peace in the state".

48

'l'he resolut ion was passed by the Republican .rna jori ty,
while the minority vigorously opposed it, protesting
that it was a Republican ruse to introduce martial
49

law in the state for political purposes.
however, was useless.

Protest,

On January 5, troops dispatched

from New Orleans by General Sheridan, marched on
Vicksburg and ousted the sheriff chosen at a special
50

election and reinstated Crosby.

Though the attempt

to purge the government was futile, nevertheless the
lessons learned were the A,B,C's of ultimate victory.
48.
49.

50.
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The regular session of the state legislature
was scheduled to convene on the 5th of January 1875.
Knowing tllis, the taxpayers from fifth-two counties
gathered at Jackson on the 4th to adopt resolutions
51
to be submitted to the legislature.
Arter listing
in detail the grievances of the taxpayers, their
protest concluded:
Our present appeal amounts to this shall the few officials, the mere servants
of the people, be permitted to fatten and
grow richer, whilst the people grow poorer
and starve? Shall these public servants
be privileged to enjoy an extravagant waste
of money of the people, to the destruction
of the property of the state, or will the
legislature interpose immediately, and by
vigorous system of wise reforms enforce
rigid economy of expenditures in all departments of the government - legislative,
executive and judicial~ in counties, cities,
towns,and districts? 5~
The legislature convened on January 5 and
remained in session until April 6, 1875.

Its

answers to the demands of the taxpayers were a
series of bills more burdensome than ever before
to the anemic taxpayers.

51.
52.
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Governor Ames and his tribe were to have
one more fling before the native forces
of law, order, and decency were to
drive them from the state. 53
The first of the series was the District Printing
Bill passed by the

reco~nendation

of the Governor,

by which the governor aimed "to support a partisan
54
press and control it in his interests".
The
Pearl River Bill, signed by the governor, was still
55
more odius because of the swindle it embraced.
Still another was a bill empowering the governor to
appoint connty tax collectors, a function heretofor
reserved to the sheriff, and hence controlled to
some extent by county vote.

This new bill removed

popular control and placed the appointing power in
56
The State Supreme
the hands of the governor.
Court declared this law to be unconstitutional, and
thus saved the state from the abuses that would
na turally have followed.

'lihe Iv:Letropoli tan Police

Bill, still another in the series, conferred upon
the governor the power to maintain a militia to

53.
54.
55.
56.
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police the state.

It also gave him absolute

control over the police system in Viarren
and Vicksburg.

Co~nty

For this he was granted $2,000,000

for the state militia and $200,000 for his "Warren
57
County Police Force".
Another measure legislated
for the appointment of special revenues inspectors
for each district.

This should have provided for

honest collections and returns, but in reality it
was a measure to provide for the "hangers-on" of
58
the administration.
Tne last and perhaps the
greatest abuse of the legislature was authorizing
the lease of state convicts to its own members
without compensation to the state, though the convicts were subsequently sub-leased for a large sum.
'The appropriation of the legislature was somewhat reduced in comparison to former sessions, but
this was accomplished only by the defeat of the
60
Police Bill.
Such legislation proved to be the
straw that broke the cfu'llel f s back.

57.
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CHAPTEH VII
DElv10CRATIC HOlVIE RULE

1876
The year 1875 opened with an active protest
against Republican rule.

The Taxpayers' Conven-

tion held early in January of that year was an
organized effort to unite all men, white and
colored, Democrats and Republicans, in opposition
to the ever increasing rates of taxation.

At\the

outset this organization was not political, but as
the November election approached the members had no
alternative but to unite with the Democratic party
whose platform enunciated the very principles for
which they were fighting.

The election of 1873

proved conclusively that the so called Conservative
party, which had appealed to all whites irrespective
of political affiliations, was dead.

The overwhelming

Republican victory in that year smothered all hope of
reorganization.

It became clear, then, that if the

Republican party was to meet with any opposition,
that opposition must come from the Democratic party.
VVith the advent of the Republican party in 1862,
and their immediate rise to power, the Democratic
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party was virtually crushed.

It was so disorgan-

ized that in 1873 they deemed it inexpedient to
nominate their own ticket.

Not now all that was

past; and they faced a new crisis, to save Mississippi
1
from the rule of the Republicans.

ts early as

~~rch

3 the initial step was taken

to unify all opposition.

On that day the reorgani-

zation of the Democratic party was entrusted to
John M. Stone and a committee of forty-two members,

2

to whom fell the onerous task of preparing for the
state convention to be held at Jackson, on August 3.
'l'he hopes of the leaders were high, because of
Democratic victories in the North which returned a
Democratic majority to the House of Representatives.
Conditions in the state, likewise, were encouraging,
for internal disputes were rending the Republican
party, and, though that party claimed to embrace
twenty-five or thrity percent of the Mississippi's
3

whites,

1.
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3.

it was evident that, unless there were
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drastic changes in the Radical policy, these votes
could easily be won by the Democrats.
That the Republican party was fast coming
under the control of the negro element, the politics
of Warren county gave ample proof and warning.

The

adoption of the "colored line" in many counties
forced white men to desert the Republican fold for
the Democrats, a clear example of which was in the
defeat of the Metropolitan Police Bill,

When the

Bill was introduced in the Senate after its passage
by the house, the white Republicans joined with the
Democrats to bring about its defeat.
'lihis defeat may be said to symbolize the
failure of the Ames administration, for
besides depriving the governor of a
powerful weapon in combating white
guerrilla tactics, it showed that when
the color-line was drawn party loyalties
were forgotten. 4
With this in mind, the Democrats met at Jackson
prepared to do all that was possible to unite both
races ttin a determined effort to secure the blessings
of an honest, economical government administered by
4. David H. Donald, The Restoration of Home Rule in

Mississippi, M. A. Thesis, University of Illinois,
1942, 75.
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able, efficient, and competent public officers".
6

The platform adopted

was of such a nature so as

to appeal to all well meaning citizens.

Bromises

of reform were followed by a scathing denunciation
of the carpetbag rule:
Building up partisan newspapers by legislation, arming militia in time of peace,
unconstitutional attempts to take from
the people the election of tax collectors,
the attempted passage of the Metropolitan
Police Bill, attempted corruption of the
judiciary by the use of executive patronage,
we denounce as gross outrages upon constitutional liberties. While as evidence of
the utter incapacity of our present rulers
to administer the affairs of the state, we
point to the mass of confusion in which the
revenue and registration laws of the state
have become envolved, the necessity of
extraordinary sessions of the legislature
to cure the blunders and follies of the
regular sessions and to the repeated executive
and legislative acts which have been by the
Supreme Court declared unconstitutional and
void. 7 ,
This was an ultimatum to the citizens.

'j,;he choice

was left to them, but the Democrats left the convention with one resolve to win the election "by
8

ballots if possible, by bullets if necessary".
5.
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The Democrats campaigned with utmost vigor.
Men left their fields, shops and stores to take
part in a state wide canvass.

Local clubs were formed

to make sure that every white voter had registered.
Elaborate displays were in order; men women and
children paraded day and night; barbecues and political rallies were held everywhere in an attempt
9

to win over all honest citizens.

There was a great

display of arms and munition, so much so that it
prompted the colored Representative in Congress to
write:
Nearly all Democratic clubs in the state
were converted into armed military
companies. 10
But even though the clubs were semi-military in
character, the one thing the Democratic leaders
feared was armed conflict.

Every effort was made

to avert any riot, for they did not wish the recurrence of the Vicksburg aftermath.

by experience

the Democrats had learned that Negro-Republican
majorities could be nullified by an armed and resolute band of whitemen, but on the other hand they
9.
10.
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knew that federal intervention would automati11
cally cancel any Democratic success.
'l'he Republicans, for their part, equalled the
preparations of the Democrats.

Clubs were formed,

and at weekly meetings the members were harangued
by white leaders.

'J.'he colored were instructed how

to register and how to vote..I.hey were indoctrinated by Republican politicians and came to believe
that a Democratic victory would bring re-enslavement
of the Negroes.

Armed demonstration were also made by

the colored who were told that they had to fight to
12
maintain their freedom.
With two camps fighting for the same goal, conflicts were bound to occur despite the warnings and
exhortations of the Democratic leader, General George.
The surprising fact is not that there were riots,
I,.

but that there were not more of them.

Yazoo city
13
was the scene of the first racial disorder, caused
it seems, by the speech of A. T. Morgan, sheriff and

11.
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"boss" of the county.

Three Negroes and one

white lost their lives as guns fired and knives
flashed.

More serious than the riot, though, was

the fear of Negro revenge.

It was rumored that

the plantation Negroes were arming to sack the
city.

Political differences were quickly forgotten

as all the whites prepared to meet the mob.

Fortu-

nately disaster was averted by Morgan, who appealed
to the governor for support, rather than to the mob.
Though promised reinstatement by the governor with
the help of three hundred negro militia, Morgan wisely
14
declined in face of certain defeat and bloodshed.
The most serious riot during the campaign was
the one which terrorized the town of Clinton in
15
Hinds County.
At a joint political rally tempers
became hoo hot to control, and from an unknown source
the firing began, with the handful of whites outnumbered by the thousands of colored.

The Negroes

were the aggressors, and for a time the ·whites
resisted, but soon they fled for their lives.
14.
15.
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In the chase that followed two of the whites were
horribly killed and mutilated.

A general alarm

was sent out and a citizen soldiery of two hundred
'..vhites was formed, and re-enforcements were rushed
to Clinton from Jackson and Vicksburg, for it was
believed that there was to be a general massacre.
In the days that followed a reign of terror existed
in the community, during which Negroes were hunted

16

like beasts and some twenty or thirty were killed.
Three days after the outbreak of the riot,
Governor Ames, issued a proclamation demanding the
immediate dispersion of all armed mobs who defied
the laws and disturbed the peace.

The whites re-

fused to disband, but instead offered to place white
military companies at the disposal of the governor
to maintain order should occasion arise.

Governor

Ames feared rather than trusted the white militia,
and all too quickly sent an urgent plea to President
Grant for federal troops.
17
curtly refused.
16.
17.
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His request, however, was
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Denied Federal

as~istance,

Governor Ames

proceeded to organize and enlarge the state militia.
J.he recruits were for the most part colored since
the Governor declared that "none but the colored
people had respect for the state government or would
18
support it".
It was rumored that Governor Ames
was determined to taunt the whites with negro troops
and thus to provoke race riots, for such major conflicts would insure Federal aid; with Federal aid
and the negro troops, the governor could control the
approaching election in the interest of the Republican
19

party.

As company after company was organized and

equipped, the resentment of the whites became almost
uncontrollable.

Only the urgent appeals of the

Democratic leaders and the timely intervention of the
Federal agent, C. K. Chase, prevented a bloody conflict between the whites and the blacks, and perhaps
20

a violent overthrow of the state government.
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Between the persuasive efforts of ~~.
Chase, the genuine desire of the
Democratic leaders for a peaceable.
election, and the anxiety of the
Governor to avoid the threatening war,
it was possible to make a treaty of peace,
by the terms of vvhich the militia was to
be disarmed and their arms stored under
guard; the Democratic committee was to
guarantee order, and both sifes were to
guarantee a fair election. 2
Both parties to the Peace Agreement were
faithful to their promises, and as the election day
approached verbal conflicts supplanted bloody riots.
General George was ever on the alert to cool the
tempers of the hot-headed Democrats, and for the
most part he was successful.

November 2, the elec-

tion was held amid great excitement.

In several

counties passion overcame reason and riots broke out.
This was true of only ten or twelve of the seventy22
four counties.
For the most part, therefore, an
honest and peaceful election was heldo
Under the stress of violent excitement
there were undoubtedly cases of intimidation
both by the Democrats and Republicans;
but it was nearer the standard of a fair
election than the state had witnessed for
six years. 23
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The election returned to the state and county
offices an

ove~Nhelming

Democratic majority.

Of

the 165,000 popular votes the Democrats received
24
more than a 30,000 majority.
The Republicans won
only two of the six seats in the United States Oongress, while in the state legislature the Democrats
won twenty-four of the thirty-seven in the Senate and
ninety-six of the hundred-and-seven seats in the house
25
of representatives.
In sixty-two of the seventyfour counties, Democratic officials were likewise
26
elected.
The election was hailed by the Democrats
as the great day of political emancipation, and the
bells which were rung for the Democratic victory were
the death knell of the Republican party.
President Grant saw in the M.ississippi election
only fraud and violence, and would have taken steps
to overturn the results but national affairs demanded
his attention instead.

'.L'he cause of the government

was defended by Hiram Revels, the first negro senator
of tre United States.

His appeal to the president

was an important factor in maintaining the status guo.
24.
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26.
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He wrote:
At the late convention, men, irrespective of
race, color, or party affiliation, united
and voted together against men known to be
incompetent and dishonest. 27
The legislature chosen in the November election
assembled at Jackson, January 4, 1876.

By common

consent of the Democratic majority the order of
business was to be headed by the impeachment of
Governor Ames, his running mate, Lieutenant Governor
Davis, and the Superintendent of Schools, Cardoza.
This action of the legislature was expected by the
Governor and he wrote that their purpose was "to
complete the revolution" by clearing the state offices
Republicans and to "restore the confederacy by voting
28
in Democrats".
Investigations looking for certain grounds for
impeachment was undertaken immediately.

Lieutenant

Governor Davis was the first to feel the strong arm
of the body.

On February 14 he was impeached for

accepting bribes in a pardon case, and on March 13
he was convicted by an overwhelming vote, with six
29
On February
Republicans voting for his conviction.
27.
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16 a resolution which directed the impeachment
of Cardoza was adopted, and received the affirmative vote of eleven Republicans, eight of whom
were colored.

Rather than be convicted the Super-

of Schools resigned on the e2nd and the impeach30
ment proceedings against him were dropped.
Action to secure the impeachment of Governor
Ames was begun on March 2, and the trial was set
for the 28th.

On the day of the trial the counsel

for the defendent proposed that if the charges
against the governor were dismissed he would resign
his office in honor.
the legislature.

~his

proposal was accepted by

The House withdrew the charges

and the Senate dismissed them. In both cases the
31
vote was almost unanimous.
On the following day
Governor Ames formally sent his resignation to the
32
people of Mississippi.
John M. Stone, president
of the Senate was thereupon ushered into the Governor's
office and the Reconstruction government in Mississippi
was at an end.
30.
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32.

Rowland, 202.
Garner, 405-407
John Seymore McNeilly, "Climax and Collapse of
Reconstruction in Mississippi," as quoted by
Rowland, 204.

129

And thus was severed the last strand
of the Gordian knot binding Mississippi
to the abomination gf Carpetbag and
negro domination. 3
Atter the removal of the Republicans from the
high offices of the state, the legislature corrected
item by item the flagrant abuses of Radical misrule.
Although there were no more impeachments, the blood
sucking offices and agenCies were abolished directly
34
or indirectly.
State publications were reduced in
number, and the district printing bill repealled,
thereby abolishing a large number of partisan papers.
The Gatling Gun Bill was repealled, and the militia
was paralyzed by the reduction of pay.

The salaries

of all officials and state employees were substantially
reduced.

i'Jor did the judiciary escape the purge, for

the number of chancellors and circuit judges was considerably reduced.

The elaborate and expensive school

system established by the Republicans was converted
into one of practical economy.

Revision of finances

reduced state taxation from 9 and 1/4 to 6 and 1/2
mills on the dollar within the first month of the new
35
regime.
33.
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The sweeping reform of the financial and
administrative system netted immediate results.
At last the budged was balanced; total receipts
for 1786 amounted to $981,393; total disbursements
36
$820,002.
'I'he period of economy had come and
once again lViississippi was to be given the oppo..rtunity to make her own way in the world.
The end of the carpetbag chapter in Mississippi's
history was not, however, to be written until late
in 1876, when the Republican Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, Peyton, and his associate Tarbell,
retired in November, and Democratic successors were
37
subsequently appointed.
In the same month, a
solid Democratic ticket was elected to represent
Mississippi in the United States Congress.

Demo-

cratic victory was now complete, for as they became
entrenched in all the offices, it was evident that
the Republican party was dead beyond all hope of
revival.

But this was in 1876, eleven years after

the horrible fratricide had ended; eleven long years
of forced rule, fear and hate.
36.
37.
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CHAFTER VIII
A SKELETON IN OUR CLOSET
From time to time the old bones which are
hidden deep in our nation's closet rattle and in
so doing remind us of a dark period in our country's
ff

history.

"

Had the evil effects of the tragic era

been only temporary, we might have been able to
forget; had the wounds hot been so deep, time might
have healed them, but so bitter was the resentment
in the hearts of southerners that even today they
hate the "damned yankee".
Mississippi and the southern states were faced
with social, economis, financial, and political problems which, unfortunately, they themselves were not
permitted to meet until irreparable damage had been
done.

Only after the Radical Republican leaders had

spent themselves in avenging private grudges, only
after a Republican Congress had made such an utter
mess of things, only after the Republican party had
wholly alienated the southern whites, were the
southerners able, through sweat and blood, to win
the right to solve the problems themselves.
131

It is
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It is little wonder today that that party has
such a small following in the South.

Do what

they may, the Republicans cannot undo what has
already been done; they cannot erase the picture
they themselves have imprinted on the memories of
the southerners nor the fact from the pages of our
historyo
By 1876 home rule was finally restored in the
majority of the southern states.

Meanwhile in

Mississippi, as well as in her sister states, the
entire super-structure of life had been undermined.
Political, social and economic problems had to be
faced after Appomatox, but unfortunately they were
faced at a time when greed, hatred and vengence
ruled the hearts of men.

Had there been time for

tempers to cool and wounds to heal, the story might
have been different.

but time waits for no man.

The problems were met, but not solved.

What the

Republicans considered a panacea for all southern
trOUble, proved to be acid upon open wounds that
would ache and torment for eleven long years.
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The southern states, Mississippi especially,
were left destitute after the war.

The accumulated

capital invested in Confederate stocks, bonds and
currency, was now worthless, their banks had collapsed
and the largest investment, two billion dollars in
slaves, had been wiped out.

Factories had been

destroyed or dismantled; mining had been paralyzed.
Their only hope lay in the land, but here too they
were baffled.

Farms had deteriorated during the

war, equipment had worn out, fences rotted, fields
became overgrown, stock destroyed.

Laborers were few.

Besides the loss of Negroes, Mississippi suffered the
(

loss of one half of the male whites, and of those returning one half bore scars of battle.
tumbled; almost everyone was poor.

Land value

Readjustment,

under the most favorable conditions, would have been
a very difficult task.

Tact, firmness and good will

were required in full measure, but, sad to say, the
Radical Republicans were gifted only with firmness.
What might have proven to be an acceptable plan
of reconstruction, the merciful program of Lincoln
and Johnson, was scrapped in favor of the hard,
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revengeful policies of Congress.

'.L'he

Presidental program had been inaugurated and had
been acceptable to the South as well as to many
northerners, but it was not to withstand the opposition of Oharles Sumner in the senate, and Thaddeus
Stevens in the house.

They attacked the work of

the administration on two points:

first, if this

reconstruction work should be accepted as final,
presidential supremacy would be continued; and
secondly, it let the South off without public confession of sin and without due punishment.

Undoubtedly

the Radicals represented a minority when they set out
to undo what had been done, but they had the untold
advantage of a smoothly working organization under
the leadership of Sumner and Stevens.
At first this element had no definite program,
but it did have a general idea of what it wanted:
stevens avowedly hated the average southern whites
and wanted to see them punished; Sumner desired to
see the work of the war rounded out by elevating
the freed Negro to a position of social and political
equality with the white.

Opposed to the Radicals
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were conservative Repuc;licans who, unfortunately,
had no clear cut program or leader of their own,
and Democrats , still under a cloud because of the
Copperhead element in their ranks.

Had there been

some one to coalesce tfuis anti-Radical strength, as
Lincoln possibly might have done, the story of reconstruction might not have been so sordid.
When the first post-war congress assembled, the
Radicals were busily engaged in undermining the presidential plan.

~hose

southerners who presented them-

selves as senators and representatives were refused
seats in the respective houses lest they have a voice
in determining their own fate.

Capitalizing on, and

over-emphasizing the conditions in the South, the
Radicals were successful in capturing public opinion,
and so placed President Johnson on the defensive.
In short order Congress passed a new Freedman's
Bureau Act and a Civil Rights Bill which ceme to be
law despite the president's veto.

Johnson's ill

advised condemnation of the latter lost for him the
support of many moderate Republicans in congress
and in the country at large.

,.
~

'.

Victory at the polls
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in 1866 was interpreted as a vote of confidence
by the RadicalS, and with their strength augmented
by some fifty votes, it was only a matter of time
till their entire program was actualized.

In

rapid succession reconstruction bills and constitutional amendments were introduced and passed by
congress, the sum and substance of which was to
curtail the powers of the chief executive and to
humble the South.
Military commanders and subordinate officials
were appointed by congress and the former was made
supreme.

The major portion of southern whites

was disfranchised, and in the reconstruction conventions throughout the South the Carpet-baggers,
Scalawags and Negroes were dominant.

Members of

these unwanted classes met with little opposition
and were elected to state as well as national office.
As a result lawlessness and disorder prevailed to
an alarming degree; reckless extravagance and almost
unparalleled venality on the part of officials
meant tremendous increase of state and local debt

\.

as well as taxation.
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Radical control of state and national governments depended on the suppression of the political
powers of the southern whites and the control of
the Negro votes.

Locally the control of offices

meant the perpetuation of authority so long as the
protecting arm of the national government was not
withdrawn, and it would not be withdrawn as long as
the Radicals steered the ship.

Consequently the

Freedman's Bureau, the Union League and, oftentimes,
educational works and even churches, were little
more than political tools used to maintain the political machine by securing a straight Republican vote.
The few whites among ,their ranks gradually deserted
the party as they becam.e disgusted with the methods
used and the results produced.

Consequently to the

southerners, Repllblicans came to mean Negroes,
~orthern

carpet-baggers and federal office holders

leaning all the time more heavily upon the Washington
government.
As early as 1868 the structure erected by the
Radical leaders had to be reenforced.

In the

presidential election of that year Grant was carried
into office on the Negro vote, but in several states
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Republican control wavered.

Congress therefore

rushed to aid the tottering structure by passing
the ]'ifteenth amendment and the Enforcement Acts
which were designed to place election under federal
rather than state control.
overplayed their hand.

but the Radicals had

'J.'he South was lost to the

Republicans as the whites united to form a "solid
South".

In the North, too, men were tired of trying

to reform the South by outside agencies, and more and
more were convinced that the South should be left to
deal with its own problems.

Consequently the Repub-

lican party was split into the Liberals and Radicals,
and although the former were not strong enough to
carry the election of 1872 nevertheless their views
and objectives had to be reckoned with.

Consequently,

by an act of Congress, the political disabilities
were removed from almost all but a few hundred of
those originally proscribed.
In 1874 the Republican majority in the house was
finally overturned, the first time since 1861, and
the

Democrats had a voice in national legislation.

One by one the southern states succeeded in ousting
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the Negroes, carpetbaggers and scalawags from
local, state and national offices.

Thus by the

fall of 1876 when Mississippi re-established
home rule, the reconstruction governments in all
but Florida, South Carolina and Louisiana had come
to an end.

The newly elected state governments lost

no time in righting the wrongs of the past eleven
years.
The Republicans who had once envisioned a
solid political power in Mississippi and in the
other southern states saw their elaborate system
crumble; the carpetbaggers who had come to prey on
the conquered found themselves without friends,
influence or wealth.

Outcasts of southern society,

both were forced out of the state, out of the South.
What could have been theirs was now gone, and they
had only themselves to blame.

It was not the fact

of the emancipation of the slaves that had turned
Mississippi and the South against them, it was the
tragic era of reconstruction.

In 1876, when

Mississippi finally became a state for the lViississippians, the door was firmly closed against the
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Republican Party, and to this day it has not
been re-opened, because written on the pages of
its history is a story the South cannot forget the story of reconstruction.

Bibliography

Primary Sources:
Commager, Henry Steele, Documents of American History,
New York, F. S. Crofts and Company, 1943, 2 vols.
Flemming, Walter Lynwood, Documentary History of
Reconstruction, Cleveland, Arthur H. Clark Company,
1907, 2 vols.

Secondary Sources:
Adams, James Truslow, America's Tragedy, New York,
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1935.
Cook, Walter Henry, Secret Political Societies in the
South during the period of Reconstruction, Cleveland,
Evangelical Publishing House.
DuBois, William Edward Burghart, Black Reconstruction,
New York, Harcourt Brace and Company, 1935.
Dunning, William Archibald, Reconstruction, Political
and EConomic, 1865-1867. (American Nation Series,
XXII~ Albert Bushnell Hart, ed.)
New York, Harper
and Brothers, 1907.
Dunning, William Archibald, Essays Qa Civil War and
Reconstruction, New York, MacMillan and Company, 1910.
Flemming, Walter Lynwood, The Sequel to Appomatox, New
Haven, Yale University Press, 1921.
Garner, James Wilford, Reconstruction in Mississippi,
New York, The MacMillan Company, 1901.
Henry, Robert Selph, The Story of Reconstruction,
New York, Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1938.
Lynch, John R. The Facts of Reconstruction, New York,
The Neale Publishing Company, 1913.

Randall, J. G., The Civil War and Reconstruction,
New York, D. C. Heath Company, 1937.
Rhodes, James Forde, History of United States, London,
MacMillan Company, 1909, Vols. V, VI, VII.
Rowland, Dunbar, Encylopedia History of Mississippi
History, Atlanta, Southern Historical Publication
Association, 1907, Vols. I, II.
Rowland, Dunbar, History of Mississippi, The Heart
of the South, Chicago, '1'he S. J. Clark Company, 1925,
Vol:I'I.

Publications:
Johnston, Frank, "Suffrage and Reconstruction in
Mississippi", MiSSissippi Historical SOCiety,
Publications, VI, 141-245.
McNeilly,John Seymore, "Climax and Collapse of
Reconstruction in Mississippi, 1847-1896," MiSSissippi
Historical Society, Publications, XII, 283-475.
, "The Enforcement Act of 1871 and
MiSSissippi
Historical Society, Publications, IX 109-171.
~t~h-e-K~u-K~l-u-x-Kl~-an--~i-n~Mississippi,"

'l'hesis:
Donald, David H. '11he Restorat ion of Home Rule in
Mississippi, M. A. Thesis, University-or-Illinois,
Urbana, 1942.

APPROVAL

The thesis submitted by John J. Beckman, S.J.
has been read and approved by three members of the
Department of History
The final copies have'been examined by the director of the thesis and the signature which appears
below verifies the fact that any necessary change3
have been incorporated,
given

final

approval

and that the thesis is now

with

reference

to

content,

form, and mechanical accuracy.
The

thesis

is

fulfillment of the
Master of Arts.

~11,'141
Date

therefore accepted in partial
requirements for

the

degree of

